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Farris: Flying Inside America's Drone Dome and Landing in Aerial Trespass

FLYING INSIDE AMERICA’S DRONE DOME
AND LANDING IN AERIAL TRESPASS LIMBO
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are standing in your kitchen late Saturday morning. 1
You pour the last cup of coffee into your stained mug, turn off the pot, and
gaze out your kitchen window. The summer sun floods your backyard.
You see your daughters sunbathing in swimsuits, eyes glued to their
phones. A drone hovers above them. You notice the grass needs cut. You
take a sip of coffee and try to remember what you were doing.
Wait a minute.
Was that a drone?
You don’t own a drone.
You run back to the window. A drone hovers above your daughters,
light flashing. Your children have no idea. Time to think fast. What are
your options? You could run outside with a broom and try to shoo the
drone away. But a broom does nothing to prevent the drone’s triumphant
return. What if you ran outside with a shotgun and blasted the drone out
of the sky?
Either way, you should have grounds for legal recourse.2 Private
property owners have rights and the drone pilot messed with your bundle
of sticks.3 Putting the complicated elements for invasion of privacy aside,
your obvious homerun is trespass, right?4 Wrong.5 Your trespass claim
likely fails because you cannot satisfy aerial trespass under either the
Restatement or new state statutes.6

This is a hypothetical situation created by the author, inspired by a Kentucky case. See,
e.g., Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, 2017 WL 1088093 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2017).
2
See Elizabeth Austermuehle, Drones and Private Property Rights, 34 WESTLAW J.
AVIATION, no. 26, Feb. 22, 2017, at 1, 2 (reporting owners may use tort law to sue invading
drones unless regulations give drones permission).
3
See infra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (describing the bundle of sticks given to
property owners).
4
See Austermuehle, supra note 2, at 2 (finding tort claims available for property owners
against drone invasions include trespass and privacy claims). This Note focuses on trespass,
not invasion of privacy. For a detailed discussion on drones and privacy rights, see generally
Nicole D. Milos, It’s a Bird! It’s a Plane! No . . . It’s a Drone. How Privacy Laws Fare in the Age of
Private-Use UAVs, 63 PRAC. LAW. 31 (2017) (applying drone invasions to privacy).
5
See Troy A. Rule, Drone Zoning, 95 N.C. L. REV. 133, 180–81 (2016) (explaining that
common law trespass claims cannot handle the rapid growth of drone technology). See
ALISSA M. DOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42940,
INTEGRATION OF DRONES INTO DOMESTIC AIRSPACE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2013)
(discussing complicated legal issues involving drones, like if flight over private property
creates trespass).
6
See infra Part III (analyzing the problems with bringing aerial trespass claims in court
today).
1
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To fulfill a claim for aerial trespass under the Restatement, you must
first navigate the undefined territories of the immediate reaches element.7
Next, you must travel through the foggy realm of the substantial
interference element.8
Alternatively, your state may have an aerial trespass statute. 9
Unfortunately, you lose again.10 State statutes will tell you the first aerial
trespass is free.11 They will also tell you that you need to hunt down the
drone pilot and tell him to keep his drone off your property. 12 Once you
exhibit this hostile showing over your own property, you can bring an
aerial trespass claim.13 But you still have to wait for that same drone to
return.14 Remember, the first aerial trespass is free.15
Try bringing the claim in federal court and you lose again. 16 Federal
agencies probably cannot touch the drone pilot, and federal courts do not
care about drone tort claims or private property disputes.17 All you really
want is to keep that drone away from your backyard, but the effort is
unreasonable and the potential litigation is not worth the time or money. 18
This Note proposes that state courts must define aerial trespass to give
property owners some rights against drones.19 Part II explains the
collision between airspace rights and federal regulations and introduces
holes in current aerial trespass options. 20 Part III isolates each aerial
trespass option, targets its flaws, and closes the door to the Restatement,
7
See infra Part III.A (applying the elements of aerial trespass by an aircraft to a drone).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1979) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
8
See infra Part III.A.
9
See infra Section II.C.2 (describing states with drone aerial trespass statutes).
10
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the problems with state aerial trespass statutes that target
drones).
11
See infra Part III.B (discussing state statutes allowing drones one free pass to invade
private property).
12
See infra Part III.B.
13
See infra Part III.B (comparing state statutes that require property owners to chase the
drone and warn the pilot to the adverse and hostile element of adverse possession).
14
See infra Part III.B (finding drones must trespass twice, and the second time must come
after a hostile showing by the property owner).
15
See infra Part III.B.
16
See infra Part III.C (explaining why drone tort claims do not fall into federal jurisdiction).
17
See infra Part III.C (teasing apart FAA regulatory limits and lack of federal court concern
over drone torts).
18
See infra Part III (describing the problems with bringing aerial trespass claims to court
today).
19
See infra Part IV (offering a new approach to protect private property owners from
unwanted drone invasions).
20
See infra Part II (outlining how aircraft retracted property owner airspace rights, the
purposes of trespass, Congress and the FAA’s back-and-forth over federal airspace, and the
impact on property owners’ legal remedies).
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state statutes, and federal courts. 21 Finally, Part IV argues courts must
redefine aerial trespass with arrive-and-hover laws to protect property
owners from unwanted drone invasions.22
II. BACKGROUND
Aerial trespass remains undefined. 23 Today’s laws carve no aerial
boundary separating private property from federal airspace. 24 Initially,
property extended to the heavens to protect the owner’s right to exclude.25
But planes made ownership of heavenly airspace impractical.26 When
Congress claimed United States air, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) took charge, creating an aerial warzone between FAA regulations
and state and federal laws.27 Courts continue to leave a chunk of air with
property owners, but no clear aerial boundary exists. 28 Without an aerial
boundary, federal regulations continue to swallow exclusion rights
deeded to property owners.29
21
See infra Part III (analyzing the problems with using the Restatement’s approach for
aerial trespass by aircraft and statutes that target drone aerial trespass, and analyzing why
remedies at the federal level do not exist).
22
See infra Part IV (suggesting arrive-and-hover laws replace basic trespass elements to
define aerial trespass).
23
See Austermuehle, supra note 2, at 2 (“[E]xisting legislation regarding drones does not
explicitly address the trespass or privacy concerns of real property owners with regard to
flying [drones] over their land.”); Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV.
155, 188 (2015) (suggesting laws should “plainly define[] landowners’ interests in the lowaltitude airspace above their land” to “simplify aerial trespass . . . claims involving drones”).
24
See JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH 135 (3d ed. 2015) (stating that “vertical dimensions of real property” are unclear
today). See also Mark J. Connot & Jason J. Zummo, Everybody Wants to Rule the World: Federal
vs. State Power to Regulate Drones, 29 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 15 (2016) (explaining that the FAA
claims “sole ‘authority’” to regulate airspace but defers some tort issues to states).
25
See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 49 (calling the right to exclude “one of the
most essential” land rights). The right to exclude originated in English common law after
economic and social changes in the 1500s “enclosed” land, which subsequently ended the
English tradition of communal farming and the special rights given to peasants to freely
roam across the land, remove resources, and raise livestock. Id. Scholars credit Sir William
Blackstone with “the absolutist view” of the right to exclude. See id. (quoting Sir William
Blackstone, “[e]very such entry or breach of a man’s close carries necessarily along with it
some damage or other”).
26
See infra Part II.A.
27
See infra Part II.B.
28
See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (granting title of the immediate
reaches airspace to property owners after planes flying as close as eighty feet above the land
interfered with the land’s use as a chicken farm); RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 159 cmt. l
(attempting to define immediate reaches between fifty and 500 feet above the property); infra
Part II.A.
29
See infra Part II.A. See also infra Part II.B (discussing recent federal regulations that allow
drones to fly closer to property owner air than what is provided to most airplanes).
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Part II.A departs from Sir Edward Coke’s ancient airspace rights,
passes over the Wright brothers, and lands in the Supreme Court. 30 Part
II.B takes off from the Supreme Court, connects with Congress and the
FAA, and lands inside the FAA’s latest regulations, Part 107. 31 Finally,
Part II.C peeks into today’s options for flying aerial trespass in court.32
A. Planes Trim Property Rights
In the beginning, a property owner held “cujus est solum, ejus est usque
ad coelom et ad inferos,” or title from earth’s core to the heavens. 33 This
slender property column included certain property owner rights, often
referred to as a “bundle of sticks.” 34 These sticks allowed a property
owner to transfer, use, exclude, and destroy the property. 35 Many
scholars find the right to exclude “‘one of the most essential sticks’ in the
bundle.”36 Property owners swing this exclusion stick through trespass
claims.37 Once an actor pierces the “close” of someone else’s property
column without permission, the actor violates the right to exclude,
creating a trespass.38
See infra Part II.A (discussing how property rights diminished over time).
See infra Part II.B.
32
See infra Part II.C (providing methods for bringing aerial trespass in court today).
33
SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 135 (describing early English courts’ grant of
a “slender column” of title extending above and below the property); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 7, § 159 cmt. g (quoting Sir Edward Coke).
34
SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 25–26 (explaining property rights as “a bundle
of rights, or more informally, a bundle of sticks” given to property owners (emphasis
omitted)). See also J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711,
712 n.1 (1996) (critiquing the bundle of rights, but pointing out “that [the bundle of rights]
has become the standard starting point for an inquiry into the nature of property”).
35
See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 26 (outlining “the most important ‘sticks’
in the bundle are: [t]he right to transfer[; t]he right to exclude[; t]he right to use[; and t]he
right to destroy”).
36
Id. at 49 (“Indeed, the Supreme Court has characterized the right to exclude ‘as one of
the most essential sticks’ in the bundle.” (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
176 (1976))). The bundle of sticks metaphor illustrates abstract property rights as tangible.
See Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle of Sticks, 19
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 376–77 (pointing out the metaphor may harm interpretations
of property principles for illustrating property rights as more absolute than they really are,
failing to balance private property rights with public interests). The Supreme Court “plac[es]
the landowner’s ‘right to exclude’ at the top of the woodpile” and “canonized the right to
exclude others as ‘essential’ to the concept of private property.” Id. at 377 (citing Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
37
See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 49 (finding landowners invoke the right
to exclude with trespass).
38
See id. at 49–50 (comparing trespass laws today to English common law because any
intentional entry without consent creates a trespass (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 209–10 (1768) (“Every unwarrantable entry on
30
31
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Exclusion rights retracted when two brothers sketched an idea on
wrapping paper, slapped some fabric to wood, and built the first
airplane.39 After the Wright brothers’ first successful flight in North
Carolina in 1903, they contracted with the United States military, and
eventually, Congress passed the first laws granting planes use of
“navigable airspace.”40 Planes hit the sky, and property owners lost title
to heavenly air.41
Planes circled back to North Carolina in 1946 to shave more property
rights.42 In United States v. Causby, military planes flew over a chicken
farm and caused chickens to fly into barn walls, leaving the owner with
no use for the property.43 The Court shelved heavenly airspace property
rights as too antique for modern use.44 However, the Court concluded
that property owners still needed some airspace rights to fully enjoy their
land.45

another’s soil the law entitles a trespass. . . . Every such entry or breach of a man’s close
carries necessarily along with it some damage . . . .”))).
39
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 159 cmt. g (noting “[t]he advent of aviation has meant
that [owning from the soil to heaven] can no longer be regarded as law”). See also VINCENT
R. JOHNSON, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 876 (5th ed. 2013) (reporting airplanes changed
property rights that originally extended from land to heaven); The Wright Brothers & the
Invention of the Aerial Age: Inventing a Flying Machine, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L AIR & SPACE
MUSEUM,
https://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/wright-brothers/online/fly/1903
[https://perma.cc/E3G5-ZXHT] (describing the design of the machine under “Designing
the Flyer” and material used under “Construction and Fabric”).
40
See Tom D. Crouch, 1908: The Year the Airplane Went Public, AIRSPACEMAG.COM (Aug.
28, 2008), https://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/1908-the-year-the-airplanewent-public-8791602/ [https://perma.cc/G6QS-5V2L] (explaining how the Wright brothers
kept their invention a secret until contracting with Army a few years after their first flight).
See also Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, supra note 23, at 166 (discussing congressional
concerns that aircraft would need easements to fly over property under the infinite airspace
ownership theory). See generally Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568
(providing initial uses of national airspace (“NAS”)); Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,
52 Stat. 973 (amending the Air Commerce Act and defining NAS as all air above the lowest
altitude needed for safe flights).
41
See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 135 (stating that infinite ownership above
property “collapsed with the invention of the airplane”).
42
See id. at 135–36 (introducing Causby as the initial common law redaction of the heavenly
airspace doctrine and the beginning of the rights to the property’s immediate reaches).
43
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258–59 (1946) (describing how military planes
flying closely above the chicken farm scared the chickens into “flying into the [barn] walls
from fright,” destroyed “the use of the property as a commercial chicken farm,” and kept
residents awake and scared at night).
44
See id. at 260–61 (finding the “ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the
land extended to the periphery of the universe . . . has no place in the modern world,” and
“air is a public highway”).
45
See id. at 264 (“Yet it is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the
land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping
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The Court found an unconstitutional taking because frequent military
invasions into air within the immediate reaches destroyed the chicken
farm’s use.46 The Court reasoned that property rights extended into
immediate reaches airspace to protect the owner’s right to use the land
and exclude others.47 Thus, the Court shielded immediate reaches
airspace from frequent aerial invasions.48
After Causby, property owner airspace rights dropped from
“navigable airspace” to “immediate reaches.” 49 Causby’s impact rippled
through property and airspace two-fold.50 First, Congress enabled the
FAA to regulate airspace use, safety, and efficiency. 51 Second, the Causby
test navigated into the Restatement (Second) of Torts as an aircraft trespass
claim.52

atmosphere. . . . The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he
can occupy or use in connection with the land.”).
46
The Court ruled, “Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and
so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land.” Id. at 266. The Court concluded the lower court “plainly establish[ed] that there was
a diminution in value of the property and that the frequent, low-level flights were the direct
and immediate cause.” Id. at 266–67.
47
See id. at 265 (“The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that
continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We think that the
landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in
the same category as invasions of the surface.”).
48
See generally id. at 264–67. Planes that “skim the surface . . . [are] as much an
appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it.” Id. at 264.
Government “intrusion[s] so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s full
enjoyment of the property [] limit his exploitation of it.” Id. at 265.
49
Compare Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, supra note 23, at 166 (discussing the definition
of “navigable airspace” in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and how it shrunk property
owner rights), and Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (defining “navigable
airspace” as all air above the lowest altitude needed for safe flights), with United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61, 264 (1946) (replacing old common law property rights that
extended to the heavens with rights to the “immediate reaches”).
50
See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
51
See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012) (authorizing the FAA to “develop plans and policy for
the use of the navigable airspace and assign by regulation or order the use of the airspace
necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace”).
52
The Restatement uses Causby’s takings test to find aerial trespass. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 7, § 159. First, an aircraft must invade the land’s immediate reaches, which
remains undefined. Id. The Restatement suggests immediate reaches falls somewhere
between fifty and 500 feet above property. Id. Second, an aircraft must substantially interfere
with the property. Id. Substantial interference requires interfering with the use and
enjoyment of the land. Id. The Restatement is analyzed later, but for now, remember the
Restatement’s aerial trespass test requires a taking analysis. Id. See also Part III.A (analyzing
the Restatement’s aircraft trespass test as it relates to takings); infra note 123 and
accompanying text (explaining that drones are aircraft according to numerous sources,
including the FAA, federal courts, and even state statutes).
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B. Fight Over Flight: Government Branches Battle for Jurisdiction
Shortly after Causby, Congress claimed rights to all United States
airspace.53 Then, Congress enabled the FAA to regulate national
airspace.54 The FAA started by issuing some simple guidelines before
testing its regulatory reach.55 Today, the FAA claims sole authority over
every inch of airspace.56 As a result, federal courts and Congress continue
to limit the agency from such absolute regulatory reach.57 Section II.B.1 of

53
See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2012) (claiming “exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the
United States”).
54
See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012) (cloaking the FAA with duties like developing plans
for using navigable airspace, regulating airspace for safety, and ensuring efficient use of
airspace).
55
Compare AC 91-57, infra note 62 (differentiating between manned and unmanned
aircraft), with Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg.
6689, 6689–90 (Feb. 13, 2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91) (defining specific classes of
drones and how each should be regulated), and Operation and Certification of Small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 42,194 (June 28, 2016) (suggesting states
consult the FAA before writing any laws that apply to drones or any low-altitude
restrictions).
56
See Huerta v. Haughwout, No. 3:16-cv-358 (JAM), 2016 WL 3919799, at *4 (D. Conn. July
18, 2016) (finding the FAA claims “regulatory sovereignty over every cubic inch of outdoor
air in the United States”); Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 144, 150 (“[T]he FAA continues
to assert broad preemptive authority over both [hobby] and commercial drones uses,” using
broad interpretations of its Congressional authority to keep air safe, and “has conveniently
opted to interpret [airspace above the United States] to encompass every inch of airspace
above land, all the way to the ground, at least when it comes to air safety regulation.”). See
also Connot & Zummo, supra note 24, at 15 (“[T]he FAA considers any state operational drone
restrictions on flight altitude, flight paths, or airspace to infringe on its authority.”).
57
See infra Section II.B.2 (noting Congress and federal courts have limited the FAA from
applying certain regulations to hobby drones). The growth of administrative agency power
is no legal secret. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Administrative State and the Common Law:
Regulatory Substitutes or Complements?, 65 EMORY L.J. 1705, 1710 (2016) (reporting “[t]he
growth of the administrative state poses a threat to the common law of torts”). Supreme
Court Justices express concern that current trends in administrative agency power gravitate
toward tangling government branches. See id. at 1714–22 (quoting some Justices concerned
with the expanding reach of agencies and concluding “if an agency is allowed to interpret its
own regulations, it wields the power to both write the law (a legislative function) and
interpret and enforce the law (an executive function), thus raising a serious separation-ofpowers issue”). Congress gave the FAA regulatory authority over national airspace. 49
U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012). Recently, Congress instructed the FAA to incorporate drones
into national airspace via the FAA Modernization and Reform Act (FMRA). FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, Feb. 14, 2012, 126 Stat. 11
(codified 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note). However, Congress limited FAA regulations from reaching
hobby drones. See id. § 336 (enacting a special rule that exempts hobby drones from FAA
regulations). As far as administrative law is concerned, this Note focuses on FAA attempts
to circumvent FMRA’s hobby drone limitation. See infra Section III.C.2 (analyzing the
hazards the FAA’s FMRA interpretation poses on property owners). See, e.g., Taylor v.
Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089, 1090–94 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding an FAA regulation requiring hobby
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this Note outlines the FAA’s transition from advisory regulations to
Section II.B.2 describes Congress’s FAA
regulatory overreach.58
Modernization and Reform Act (FMRA) and the FAA’s FMRA
interpretation.59 Section II.B.3 explains the FAA’s Final Rule on drones,
the Final Rule’s creation of a drone dome inside America, and the drone
dome’s implications on the airspace rights of property owners.60
1.

The FAA Prepares for Take Off

Congress enacted the FAA in the 1950s, and about twenty years later,
drones soared across the FAA’s radar.61 First, the FAA issued Model
Aircraft Operating Standards in Advisory Circular 91-57 (“AC 91-57”).62
AC 91-57 separated model airplanes (or unmanned aircraft) from manned
aircraft and suggested model airplane pilots use AC 91-57 as a safety

drones to register with the FAA invalid because FMRA clearly prevented the FAA from
regulating hobby drones).
58
See infra Section II.B.1 (describing the FAA’s first regulations).
59
See infra Section II.B.2.
60
See infra Section II.B.3 (explaining relevant implications of the FAA’s Final Rule on
property owners). See, e.g., Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(“Final Rule”), 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 42,064 (June 28, 2016) (providing roughly 400 pages
discussing the FAA’s Final Rule).
61
See Joshua Kohler, The Sky Is the Limit: FAA Regulations and the Future of Drones, 15 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 151, 156 (2016) (reporting Congress enacted the FAA in 1958, but unmanned
aircraft remained free from regulations until the “model aircraft operating standards” in the
FAA’s Advisory Circular 91-57). This Note will refer to “model aircraft” as hobby drones.
See Shane Crotty, Note, The Aerial Dragnet: A Drone-ing Need For Fourth Amendment Change,
49 VAL. U. L. REV. 219, 223–24 n.33 (2014) (“For purposes of this Note, the term ‘drone’ will
be used interchangeably to mean an unmanned aerial vehicle, unmanned aircraft system,
remotely piloted vehicle, remotely operated aircraft, and other potential synonyms for an
aircraft that operates without an onboard pilot.”).
62
See FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, AC 91-57 (CANCELLED)—MODEL AIRCRAFT
OPERATING
STANDARDS
(June
9,
1981),
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_
policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentid/22425
[https://perma.cc/7C8D-SCQ4] [hereinafter AC 91-57] (providing a pdf version of the initial
Advisory Circular 91-57). On September 2, 2015, the FAA cancelled AC 91-57 and replaced
it with a revised version, AC 91-57A. Compare AC 91-57 (noting the cancellation of the
original AC 91-57), with FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, AC 91-57A—MODEL AIRCRAFT
OPERATING STANDARDS—INCLUDING CHANGE 1 (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentI
D/1028086 [https://perma.cc/MP7B-ALZC] (announcing the issuance of the updated
version of AC 91-57), and FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, AC 91-57A—MODEL
AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS—INCLUDING CHANGE 1 (Jan. 11, 2016),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_91-57A_Ch_1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/YN9C-WTXY] [hereinafter AC 91-57A] (showing a pdf version of the
revised Advisory Circular 91-57).
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standard.63 After AC 91-57, drones ghosted FAA regulations until 2007.64
In 2007, the FAA released Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National
Airspace System (“Drone Clarification”).65 Drone Clarification placed
drones into three groups: (1) public drones operated by the government;
(2) civil drones used by businesses; and (3) hobby drones, or model
airplanes.66
Drone Clarification tried to pull hobby drones into FAA regulations
for safety reasons, naming AC 91-57 as the authority for hobby drones. 67
Meanwhile, presidential pressures to push drones into national airspace
prompted a Congressional response that contradicted Drone
Clarification.68

See AC 91-57, supra note 62. The purpose of the Model Aircraft Operating Standards
was to “outline[], and encourage[] voluntary compliance with, safety standards for model
aircraft operators.” Id. However, following Congressional enactment of the Federal
Modernization and Reform Act, the FAA cancelled AC 91-57. Id.
64
See Milos, supra note 4, at 32–33 (explaining the history of drones). Early drone use
remained compartmentalized inside the military. Id at 32. However, in the 1980s and 1990s,
lack of results with drone technology slowed funding and development. Id. In the mid-90s,
the Central Intelligence Agency wanted better pictures over Bosnia and refueled drone
development. Id. Around the turn of the century, drones flew into national airspace as police
and the Department of Homeland Security built off the CIA’s use. Id. Consumers began
using drones a decade later. Id. at 33.
65
See Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689,
6689–90 (Feb. 13, 2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91) [hereinafter Drone Clarification]
(providing a summary that clarifies types of drone operations in national airspace).
66
See id.
67
See id. at 6690 (stating that “for model aircraft the authority is AC 91-57”). The FAA
reasoned that model aircraft present safety concerns, and AC 91-57 provides guidance,
encourages good judgment, and protects people on the ground. Id. Thus, “[m]odel aircraft
should be flown below 400 feet above the surface,” and “[t]he FAA expects that hobbyists
will operate these recreational model aircraft within visual line-of-sight.” Id. Therefore, the
FAA concluded that hobby drones should operate according to AC 91-57. Id.
68
See Exec. Order No. 13,479, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,241 (Nov. 18, 2008), reprinted in 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 (2012) (ordering “Transformation of the National Air Transportation System” under
United States policy “to establish and maintain a national air transportation system that
meets the present and future civil aviation . . . needs of the United States, including through
effective implementation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System”). See also
Presidential Memorandum Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding
Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80
Fed. Reg. 9355 (Feb. 15, 2015) (“As UAS are integrated into the NAS, the Federal Government
will take steps to ensure that the integration takes into account . . . public safety, [and] the
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties concerns these systems may raise.”); infra Section II.B.2
(explaining Congress passed FMRA, which prevented the FAA from regulating hobby
drones).
63
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Congress Conducts Maintenance on the FAA

In 2012, Congress passed the FMRA. 69 FMRA directed the FAA to
incorporate civil drones into national airspace.70 However, FMRA’s
Special Rule for Model Aircraft (“Special Rule”) prevents the FAA from
regulating hobby drones.71 The Special Rule includes three subsections:
69
See generally FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, Feb. 14,
2012, 126 Stat. 11 (codified 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note) [hereinafter FMRA]. See, e.g., infra note 71
(describing duties under FMRA for incorporating drones into national airspace like,
“streamline programs, create efficiencies, reduce waste, and improve aviation safety and
capacity, to provide stable funding for the national aviation system and for other purposes”).
70
See FMRA, supra note 69, § 332 Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems into
National Airspace System, § 333 Special Rules for Certain Unmanned Aircraft Systems, § 334
Public Unmanned Aircraft Systems, § 335 Safety Studies (designating timeframes for
meeting objectives like establishing test ranges and researching drone technology). See also
Kohler, supra note 61, at 157–58 (explaining functions of specific sections of the FMRA).
Basically, FMRA created specific tasks and deadlines for the FAA to prepare United States
airspace for business and government drone use. See, e.g., FMRA § 332(a)(1) (“[S]afely
accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace
system.”); § 332(a)(2)(A)(i) (“[D]efine acceptable standards for operation and certification of
civil unmanned aircraft systems.”); § 332(a)(2)(G) (requiring the “establishment of a process
to develop certification, flight standards, and air traffic requirements for civil unmanned
aircraft systems at test ranges where such systems are subject to testing”); § 332(b)(1) (calling
for a “final rule on small unmanned aircraft systems that will allow for civil operation of
such systems in the national airspace system”); § 332(c) (asking for test ranges to establish
navigation procedures for drones, to integrate drones with manned aircraft systems, and to
experiment with both civil and public drones). See, e.g., FMRA § 333(b)(1) (pinpointing
which types of drones, if any, threaten national airspace and national security); § 334(a)(2)
(encouraging “a collaborative process with public agencies to allow for an incremental
expansion of access to the national airspace system as technology matures and the necessary
safety analysis and data become available”); § 334(b) (“Not later than December 31, 2015, the
Administrator shall develop and implement operational and certification requirements for
the operation of public unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace system.”); § 335
(“The Administrator of the [FAA] shall carry out all safety studies necessary to support the
integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system.”).
71
See FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a) (stating “the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration may not promulgate any rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft
[hobby drone], or an aircraft being developed as a model aircraft” if the drone satisfies the
hobby drone definition and passes the hobby drone test). But see FMRA § 336(b) (permitting
the FAA “to pursue enforcement action against persons operating model aircraft who
endanger the safety of the national airspace system”). However, the FAA offered a unique
interpretation of FMRA. See FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, INTERPRETATION OF THE
SPECIAL RULE FOR MODEL AIRCRAFT 14–15 (June 18, 2014), https://www.faa.gov/
uas/media/model_aircraft_spec_rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYZ8-WY77] [hereinafter
FAA INTERPRETATION]. According to the FAA, Congress confirmed that hobby drones are
aircraft in FMRA. Id. at 5 (interpreting FMRA as a congressional confirmation of “the FAA’s
long-standing position that model aircraft are aircraft”). Furthermore, the FAA found that
FMRA only prevented the FAA from writing rules that specifically target hobby drones. Id.
at 7 (asserting “the prohibition against future rulemaking is not a complete bar . . . [and] the
rulemaking prohibition would not apply in the case of general rules that the FAA may issue
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(a) a hobby drone test (“the test”); (b) a safety net for the FAA to regulate
some hobby drones (“safety net”); and (c) a hobby drone definition (“the
definition”).72
Subsection (c) gives the definition for hobby drones.73 Hobby drones
must be: “(1) capable of sustained flight in the atmosphere; (2) flown
within visual line of sight of the person operating the aircraft; and
(3) flown for hobby or recreational purposes.” 74 Drones meeting the
hobby drone definition advance to the hobby drone test outlined in
subsection (a).75
Next, subsection (a) states the FAA cannot regulate a drone that passes
the hobby drone test.76 First, the hobby drone must be “flown strictly for

or modify that apply to all aircraft, such as rules addressing the use of airspace,” or rules
issued “for safety or security reasons”). According to the FAA, FMRA “does not require the
FAA to exempt model aircraft from those rules [addressing use of airspace, safety, and
security] because those rules are not specifically regarding model aircraft.” Id. at 7.
72
See FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a)–(c) (outlining general provisions, retaining safety
procedures, and defining model aircraft). Again, this Note generally refers to all model
aircraft as hobby drones. See, e.g., Crotty, supra note 61, at 223–24 n.33 (using “drone” to
replace other synonyms for unmanned aircraft and model airplanes).
73
See FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(c). See also FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 8
(interpreting FMRA § 336(c) as providing the definition for model aircraft, or hobby drones).
74
FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(c). The “hobby or recreational” use prong is also
incorporated into § 336(a)’s hobby drone test, so the aim of § 336(c)’s definition focuses on
the visual line of sight. See FMRA § 336(a)(1) (requiring that “the aircraft is flown strictly for
hobby or recreational use”); FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 8–11 (focusing on the
line-of-sight requirement when interpreting § 336(c), and saving interpretations of hobby
use, mentioned in both § 336(a)(1) and § 336(c)(3), for the section devoted to interpreting
§ 336(a)). According to the FAA, visual line of sight requires the drone pilot to be able to use
“natural vision” to see the drone “at all times.” Id. at 8. The drone pilot cannot use another
person to fulfill the visual line of sight requirement. Id. at 8–9 (“[T]he operator must be able
to view the aircraft at all times.”). Failure to meet the line-of-sight requirement presumably
expels the drone from the hobby drone exemption for failing to satisfy the hobby drone
definition. Id. at 7–9.
75
See FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a), (c) (preventing the FAA from regulating drones
meeting the definition of model aircraft found in subsection (c)). See also FAA
INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 11 (finding that drones satisfying the hobby drone
definition “must also meet the five additional criteria for model aircraft established in section
336(a) [the test] to be exempt from future rulemaking regarding model aircraft”).
76
See FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a) (excluding model aircraft surviving subsection (a)
from FAA regulations). The FMRA’s preceding sections specifically target both civil and
public drones, place deadlines on each, and delegate tasks for incorporating each into
national airspace, including integrating both types of drones with simultaneous navigation
procedures. See, e.g., FMRA § 332 (requiring federal agencies to develop a plan to integrate
civil drones into national airspace); FMRA § 333 (providing rules for civil drones); FMRA
§ 334 (allocating rules for public drones). The FMRA’s civil and public drone integration
discussion remains silent on hobby drones until the Special Rule, which prevents rules and
regulations that apply to hobby drones. Compare FMRA § 332–35 (calling for civil and public
drone integration into national airspace, with certain testing procedures, deadlines, and
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hobby or recreational use.”77 Second, the hobby drone must comply with
community safety guidelines.78 Third, the hobby drone cannot exceed
fifty-five pounds.79 Fourth, the hobby drone must steer clear of planes. 80
Finally, the hobby drone must either avoid airports or communicate with
air traffic control.81 Any drone that survives the test may fly outside FAA
regulations but only if it evades the FAA’s safety net in subsection (b). 82
Subsection (b) gives the FAA a bigger net for catching hobby drones
otherwise exempt from regulation.83 The safety net allows the FAA “to
pursue enforcement action against” hobby drones that “endanger
[national airspace] safety.”84 Thus, subsection (a) excludes hobby drones
from FAA regulations, but subsection (b) allows the FAA to attack hobby
drones that make national airspace unsafe.85
other requirements), with § 336 (prohibiting the FAA from enacting any rules or regulations
that apply to hobby drones).
77
FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a)(1). Both § 336(a) and § 336(c) restrict hobby drone use to
“flown strictly for hobby or recreational use,” and “flown for hobby or recreational
purposes,” respectively. FMRA § 336(a)(1), (c)(3). The pivotal prong is the purpose of the
drone’s use during flight. See id. (placing a hobby-use requirement in two parts of the
statute). The FAA takes a stiff approach to the hobby-use requirement, stating, “Any
operation not conducted strictly for hobby or recreation purposes could not be operated
under the special rule for model aircraft.” FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 10. See also
infra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining how the FAA interpretation of FMRA may
create a hybrid drone category outside the definitions of both civil and hobby drones).
78
See FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a)(2) (stating “the aircraft is operated in accordance with
a community-based set of safety guidelines and within the programming of a nationwide
community-based organization”). This prong intends to address “a membership based
association that represents the aeromodeling community within the United States” that
provides, develops, and maintains safety guidelines for the public. H.R. REP. NO. 112-381
(Conf. Rep.), 158 CONG. REC. H230-04, 2012 WL 300072 (Feb. 1, 2012), at H280; FAA
INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 11–12.
79
See FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a)(3) (providing “the aircraft is limited to not more than
55 pounds unless otherwise certified through a design, construction, inspection, flight test,
and operational safety program administered by a community-based organization”).
80
See id. § 336(a)(4) (enumerating “the aircraft is operated in a manner that does not
interfere with and gives way to any manned aircraft”).
81
If a drone flies “within 5 miles of an airport,” the drone pilot must “provide[] the airport
operator and the airport air traffic control tower [] with prior notice of the operation.” Id.
§ 336(a)(5). Furthermore, hobby drone pilots “flying from a permanent location within 5
miles of an airport should establish a mutually-agreed upon operating procedure with the
airport operator and the airport air traffic control tower.” Id.
82
Compare FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 6–7 (stating drones satisfying the
“statutory definition and operational requirements . . . would be exempt from future FAA
rulemaking action”), with FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(b) (retaining the FAA’s authority over
aircraft to keep airspace safe).
83
See FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(b) (giving the FAA authority over hobby drones that
“endanger the safety of the national airspace system”).
84
Id.
85
Compare FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a) (stating “the Administrator of the [FAA] may
not promulgate any rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft, or an aircraft being
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The FAA’s interpretation of FMRA narrows the escape hole Congress
granted hobby drones.86 In an official interpretation of the Special Rule,
the FAA explained how general safety rules that apply to all aircraft still
apply to hobby drones to protect property owners. 87 According to the
FAA, property owners need protection from all aircraft—including hobby
drones—and Congress left the safety net to snare hobby drones in the
FAA’s web of general safety regulations. 88
Further, the FAA interpreted the Special Rule to prevent a narrow
subset of hobby drone regulations. According to the FAA, the only
regulations prevented are those that target drones passing the hobby
drone test—all other drones qualify as “Not Hobby” drones and are
subject to FAA regulations.89 In other words, if a drone meets the hobby
developed as a model aircraft”), with § 336(b) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit the authority of the Administrator to pursue enforcement action against persons
operating model aircraft who endanger the safety of the national airspace system.”).
86
See generally FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71 (offering an interpretation of the
impact of FMRA § 336 on past and future FAA regulations as applied to all drone classes
and finding § 336(b)’s safety net expansive enough to allow the FAA to protect property
owners).
87
See id. at 7 (“Thus, the rulemaking prohibition would not apply in the case of general
rules that the FAA may issue or modify that apply to all aircraft, such as rules addressing
the use of airspace [] for safety or security reasons.”). According to the FAA, hobby drones
are not exempt from any regulations labeled as safety precautions because general aviation
safety rules do not specifically target hobby drones and instead apply to all aircraft. See id.
(“The statute does not require FAA to exempt model aircraft from [safety and security] rules
because those rules are not specifically regarding model aircraft.”). Thus, the Special Rule
prohibition that blocks the FAA from applying regulations to hobby drones still allows the
FAA to regulate hobby drones for safety purposes, according to the FAA. See id. (asserting
“the prohibition against future rulemaking is not a complete bar on rulemaking that may
have an effect on [hobby drones] . . . [and] the rulemaking limitation applies only to
rulemaking actions specifically ‘regarding a [hobby drone]’”). FMRA grants the FAA
authority to conduct “safety studies” to aid in integrating drones into national airspace. See
FMRA, supra note 69, § 335 (“The Administrator of the [FAA] shall carry out all safety studies
necessary to support the integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace
system.”). While § 335 does not specifically exclude hobby drones, the preceding sections
(§ 332–34) clearly apply to civil and public drones, and the following section (§ 336) clearly
exempts hobby drones. Compare FMRA § 332–34 (applying certain regulations and duties
for analyzing civil and public drone use in national airspace), with FMRA § 336 (preventing
regulations on hobby drones). The placement of § 335 could account for some of the FAA’s
confusion, or, more literally, act as a wedge separating drones the FAA can regulate from
those it cannot regulate. Id.
88
See FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 14–15 (“As demonstrated by the FAA’s
statutory and regulatory authorities, our charge to protect the safety of the NAS is not only
intended to protect users of the airspace, but is also intended to protect persons and property
on the ground.”). See also id. at 15 (“For example, the FAA regulates low-altitude operations
to protect people and property on the ground.”).
89
See id. at 6–7 (“[W]e conclude that aircraft that meet the statutory definition and
operational requirements . . . would be exempt from future FAA rulemaking action
specifically regarding model aircraft.”). According to the FAA, any drone that fails the
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definition but fails the hobby test, it falls into the “Not Hobby” class as a
hybrid drone—which, despite not being used for commercial profit, is still
not a hobby drone—and must comply with FAA regulations.90
One federal court denied the FAA’s interpretation of the safety net. 91
In Taylor v. Huerta, Taylor challenged an FAA regulation requiring hobby
drone registration (“Registration Rule”).92 Taylor argued the Special Rule
hobby drone test, or does not satisfy the hobby drone definition, does not qualify as a hobby
drone and is subject to FAA rules and regulations. See id. at 7 (“However, the prohibition
against future rulemaking is not a complete bar on [hobby drone] rulemaking . . . . [T]he
rulemaking limitation applies only to rulemaking actions specifically ‘regarding a model
aircraft.’”).
90
See id. at 11 (stipulating that drones meeting the hobby drone definition “must also meet
the five additional criteria for model aircraft established in section 336(a) [the test] to be
exempt from future rulemaking regarding model aircraft”). More pointedly, the FAA stated
that hobby drones “not meet[ing] these statutory requirements [hybrid drones] are
nonetheless unmanned aircraft, and as such, are subject to all existing FAA regulations, as
well as future rulemaking action, and the FAA intends to apply its regulations to such
unmanned aircraft.” Id. at 6–7. Thus, the moment a hobby drone operates outside hobby
use, it is no longer a hobby drone, loses its hobby drone protections, and falls victim to FAA
regulations, even if the drone is not being used for a business or government purpose at that
time. See id. at 10 (“Any operation not conducted strictly for hobby or recreation purposes
could not be operated under the [Special Rule].”). For example, once a drone flies outside
the operator’s visual line of sight or is used for a purpose other than “relaxation” or
“refreshment of strength and spirits after work,” the drone is no longer a hobby drone under
the FAA’s interpretation. Id. at 8–9. Even uses “incidental to a person’s business [] would
not be a hobby or recreation flight.” Id. at 10 (“Although they are not commercial operations
conducted for compensation or hire, such operations do not qualify as a hobby or recreation
flight because of the nexus between the operator’s business and the operation of the
aircraft.”). This inflexible interpretation offered by the FAA would create a category of
hybrid drones that are neither hobby drones nor civil drones, and according to the FAA,
hybrid drones are subject to existing and future FAA rules and regulations. See id. at 8–11
(asserting any violation of the hobby drone exemption subjects the drone to FAA rules and
regulations, even though the drone is not used for business purposes). The FAA tried to fill
this hybrid drone gap with a helpful chart, which allows hobby drone users to fly drones at
local model airplane clubs, take personal pictures, “mov[e] a box” for no profit, and observe
crops grown for personal use. Id. at 11. However, flying drones for profit, taking pictures
for profit, delivering boxes for profit, and observing crops “grown as part of commercial
farming operation” all qualify as “Not Hobby or Recreation.” Id. The latter examples are
not commercial uses but not hobby uses under the FAA’s interpretation, thus creating a
hybrid drone category. Id. at 11 (labeling uses as “Not Hobby or Recreation”).
91
See Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089, 1090–94 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (determining an FAA
regulation that required hobby drone registration violated the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act).
92
See Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1090–92 (finding the Special Rule trumped the FAA’s
interpretation of the safety net). See also Registration and Marking Requirements for Small
Unmanned Aircraft, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,594, 78,594–96 (Dec. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Registration
Rule] (requiring hobby drone pilots to register drones by a certain deadline, pay a five-dollar
fee, display an identification number, and provide the FAA with the owner’s name, email,
mailing address, and other registration-type information). The summary of the Registration
Rule clearly targets hobby drones, an action prevented by FMRA. Compare Registration Rule,
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prevented the FAA from writing hobby drone rules.93 The FAA argued
the Special Rule did not specifically prevent hobby drone registration and
the safety net gave the FAA authority to write hobby drone safety rules. 94
The court held the Registration Rule was invalid because the Special
Rule prevented the FAA from writing any rules that apply to hobby
drones.95 The court reasoned the Registration Rule was “undoubtedly a
rule” that applied to hobby drones, which the Special Rule prevented, and

80 Fed. Reg. 78,594 (stating “[t]his action provides an alternative, streamlined and simple,
web-based aircraft registration process for the registration of small unmanned aircraft,
including small unmanned aircraft operated as model aircraft”), with FMRA, supra note 69,
§ 336 (prohibiting the FAA from regulating hobby drones).
93
See Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1090 (explaining Taylor’s argument that, as a hobby drone pilot,
he is not required to register his hobby drone with the FAA pursuant to the Special Rule).
See also FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a), (c) (stating “the [FAA] may not promulgate any rule
or regulation regarding a [hobby drone],” and continuing to supply the hobby drone test and
definition). Taylor also challenged AC 91-57A, a provision that revised AC 91-57 by
allocating restricted areas for drone operations, but the claim is not relevant to the scope of
this Note. See, e.g., Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1092–94 (determining a procedural deadline barred
one claim from moving forward). Compare Revision of Advisory Circular 91-57 Model
Aircraft Operating Standards, 80 Fed. Reg. 54,367, 54,367 (Sept. 9, 2015) (“The revised AC
provides guidance to persons operating unmanned aircraft for hobby or recreation purposes
meeting the statutory definition of ‘model aircraft’ contained in Section 336 of the [FMRA].”),
with AC 91-57A, supra note 62 (providing a pdf version of a more recent revision to Advisory
Circular 91-57).
94
See Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1092–93 (claiming the Registration Rule was “authorized by preexisting statutory provisions that are unaffected by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act
[Special Rule]”). Essentially, the FAA’s first argument is that because the Special Rule is
silent on the hobby drone registration issue, previous laws allow the FAA to require hobby
drones to register. Id. FMRA § 336 states the FAA cannot “promulgate any rule or regulation
regarding a model aircraft.” FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a). According to the FAA, § 336
does not specifically exclude hobby drone registration. See Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1093 (“The
FAA responds that nothing in the 2012 [FMRA] prevents the FAA from changing course and
applying that registration requirement to model aircraft now.”). See id. at 1093 (arguing that
requiring hobby drones to register is within the safety net’s reach to help “improve aviation
safety”). The FAA frequently uses this airspace safety argument to seemingly stretch its
authoritative reach. See, e.g., FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 4 (noting that “[t]he FAA
first recognized in 1981 that ‘model aircraft can at times pose a hazard to full-scale aircraft in
flight and to persons and property on the surface’” (quoting AC 91-57, supra note 62)).
95
See Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1092–94. Quoting the Special Rule, the court determined that the
FAA cannot write “any rule or regulation regarding a [hobby drone].” Id. at 1093. In
addressing the FAA’s argument that the registration rule improved airspace safety, the court
concluded that while safety is important, the rule is still “barred by the text of [the Special
Rule].” Id. The court did not enter into Chevron analysis, presumably because congressional
intent was so clear that no Chevron deference was required. Compare Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1092–
94 (stating “[s]tatutory interpretation [of FMRA] does not get much simpler”), with Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–46 (1984) (finding that
administrative agencies interpreting a statute must defer to any clear Congressional intent,
but if Congress leaves “a gap for the agency to fill,” then courts must accept any reasonable
statutory interpretation by the administrative agency).
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“[s]tatutory interpretation does not get much simpler.”96 While Taylor told
the FAA to mind FMRA’s Special Rule and avoid hobby drones, FMRA
still tasked the FAA with incorporating other drones into national
airspace.97
3.

America’s Drone Dome

In June 2016, the FAA released Operation and Certification of Small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“Final Rule”) to allow drone operations in
national airspace and keep hobby drones from making national airspace
unsafe.98 Part 107 of the Final Rule drew a 400-foot flight ceiling across
America.99 The flight ceiling presumably grants qualifying drones an allaccess pass to fly anywhere within 400 feet of the ground—creating an
American drone dome.100 Part 107’s drone dome does not insulate
96
Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1092. The FAA appeared to argue that the Registration Rule was not
a new rule, but part of an old regulation that required aircraft registration. Id. at 1092–93.
The court found this argument troubling because the new registration rule used a new hobby
drone definition, the same definition used in the Special Rule. Id. See also Registration Rule,
supra note 92, at 78,604 (“The definition of ‘model aircraft’ is identical to the definition
provided in section 336(c) of Public Law 112-95 [FMRA].”) The court concluded that whether
a regulation or a rule, “[t]he new regulatory regime imposes new requirements . . . [and] new
penalties . . . on model aircraft owners who do not comply. In short, the Registration Rule is
a rule regarding [hobby drones].” Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1093.
97
See Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089, 1092–94 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding a hobby drone
registration rule violated the FMRA, which prevented the FAA from regulating hobby
drones). See, e.g., supra note 70 and accompanying text (tasking the FAA to incorporate
drones into national airspace, create efficient programs, and improve safety).
98
See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg.
42,064, 42,064 (June 28, 2016) [hereinafter Final Rule] (“The FAA is amending its regulations
to allow the operation of [drones] in the National Airspace System . . . [and] also prohibit
model aircraft from endangering the safety of the National Airspace System.”); id. at 42,065
(establishing authority under FRMA “to determine whether UAS operations posing the least
amount of public risk and no threat to national security could safely be operated in the NAS
and, if so, to establish requirements for the safe operation of these systems in the NAS”).
FMRA instructed the FAA to implement a “final rule” on drones. See, e.g., FMRA, supra note
69, § 332(b)(1) (requiring publication of “a final rule on small unmanned aircraft systems that
will allow for civil operation of such systems in the national airspace system”); id.
§ 332(a)(2)(A)(i) (stipulating that a plan for integrating civil drones into national airspace
must “define the acceptable standards for operation and certification of civil unmanned
aircraft systems”).
99
See 14 C.F.R. § 107.51 (2016) (outlining “[o]perating limitations for small unmanned
aircraft”). See also id. § 107.51(b) (2016) (defining an altitude restriction of 400 feet above
ground, with exceptions); infra note 100 and accompanying text (defining the drone dome
created by Part 107).
100
See 14 C.F.R. § 107.51(b) (2016) (“The altitude of the small unmanned aircraft cannot be
higher than 400 feet above ground.”). Drone dome refers to the all-access pass Part 107 gives
drones to fly anywhere throughout the country within 400 feet of the ground. Id. Part 107
grants per se legal flight to drones encapsulated inside the drone dome, which expands from
the ground to 400 feet in the air. Id. § 107.51(b). Presumably, the drone dome grants flight
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property owners from drones. 101 The FAA determined states control
drones landing on property, but not flying over property, because states

access to civil drones. See id. § 107.11 (“This subpart applies to the operation of all civil small
unmanned aircraft systems subject to this part.”). However, the FAA’s flexible interpretation
of FMRA creates a tight class of hobby drones and another class of drones that may be used
like hobby drones but are blended civil and hobby drones, or hybrid drones. See supra notes
86–90 and accompanying text (elaborating on the hybrid class of drones created by the FAA’s
Special Rule interpretation); infra Section III.C.2 (analyzing how a hybrid drone class under
the FAA’s interpretation is problematic for property owners). Furthermore, not-hobbies—
hybrid drones that are not technically civil and not technically hobby according to the FAA—
still have to comply with FAA regulations. See, e.g., supra notes 89–90 and accompanying
text (explaining how the FAA’s interpretation of FMRA creates a hybrid category of drones
that falls under FAA regulations). Thus, the drone dome’s applicability to hobby drones is
not entirely clear. Compare FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a) (prohibiting the FAA from
regulating hobby drones), with Final Rule, supra note 98, at 42,064 (applying the regulations
to model aircraft to keep airspace safe), and FMRA § 336(b) (granting the FAA authority to
attack hobby drones that make airspace unsafe).
101
See 14 C.F.R. § 107.51(b) (2016) (outlining the 400-foot flight ceiling); Final Rule, supra
note 98, at 42,119 (stating “[a]djudicating private property rights is beyond the scope of this
rule” and some causes of action may require applying state or local common laws). The text
addresses commenter proposals for 100-foot and 300-foot flight floors to establish “incidental
incursions” and “intentional flight across private property without permission,”
respectively. Id. Arguably, a flight floor could lead to the greatest taking of private property
rights this nation has ever seen. See Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 171 (reporting that
granting the FAA “sole control over low-altitude airspace . . . would [] arguably orchestrate
one of the largest uncompensated transfers of property interests in United States history”).
The Supreme Court already ruled in Causby that property owners only keep reachable air.
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (finding a “landowner owns at least as
much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land”).
Property owners cannot lose air they never owned and while, theoretically, a flight floor
raised high enough above immediate reaches may not be a taking, this analysis is outside
this Note’s scope. Id. Perhaps the FAA has authority to write a flight floor—perhaps not.
Compare 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a), (b) (2012) (granting the FAA regulatory authority over national
airspace), with Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 149–50 (stipulating local airspace conflicts
between drone pilots and landowners may fall outside Congress’s reserved authority for the
FAA), and Final Rule, supra note 98, at 42,119 (noting a flight floor was suggested, considered,
and apparently rejected, although the reasoning is inconclusive).
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make national airspace unsafe by writing aerial statutes. 102 Thus, states
should ask the FAA before writing aerial trespass laws. 103
In conclusion, the FAA finds: (1) the Special Rule grants the FAA
authority to regulate hobby drones for safety reasons and all other drones,
including hybrid drones, for all other purposes; and (2) states cannot write
aerial trespass laws without the FAA’s approval.104 As an administrative
agency, the FAA cannot write tort laws, so for now, property owners
remain shackled in limbo with limited options. 105

See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing the FAA’s rejection of flight-floor
proposals). See also Final Rule, supra note 98, at 42,119 (separating trespass from aerial
trespass and finding only state trespass laws applicable to drones). Despite finding that
“[a]djudicating private property rights [was] beyond the scope of this rule,” the FAA
determined “[w]ith regard to property rights, trespassing on property (as opposed to flying
in the airspace above a piece of property) without the owner’s permission may be addressed
by State and local trespassing laws.” Id. Thus, the FAA finds that drones landing on
property fall into state territory, but drones hovering above property do not. Id. See also id.
at 42,194 (finding states make airspace unsafe by writing altitude restrictions). The FAA
concluded, “[s]ubstantial air safety issues are implicated when State or local governments
attempt to regulate the operation of aircraft in the national airspace.” Id.
103
See Final Rule, supra note 98, at 42,194 (“For example, consultation with FAA is
recommended when State or local governments enact operational UAS restrictions on flight
altitude, flight paths; operational bans; or any regulation of the navigable airspace.”).
Trespass laws are not clear. Compare Final Rule, supra note 98, at 42,194 (“[L]aws traditionally
related to State and local police power [] including land use, zoning, privacy, [and]
trespass . . . generally are not subject to Federal regulation.”), with Final Rule, supra note 98,
at 42,119 (“[T]respassing on property (as opposed to flying in the airspace above a piece of
property) without the owner’s permission may be addressed by State and local trespassing
law.”). Thus, drone aerial trespass remains unclear. Id.
104
See supra Section II.B.2 (describing how the FAA concluded FMRA grants it authority
to regulate hobby drones for safety purposes, regulate all hybrid drones that fall somewhere
between hobby and civil, and why safety concerns require states to consult the FAA before
writing any aerial drone laws). See, e.g., FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 14–15 (“For
example, the FAA regulates low-altitude operations to protect people and property on the
ground.”); Final Rule, supra note 98, at 42,194 (suggesting states ask the FAA before enacting
low-altitude airspace laws).
105
See infra Part II.C (describing limited options for property owners to sue for aerial
trespass). See also Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, supra note 23, at 172 (calling for
clarification of property airspace rights against drones and pointing out the confusing
takings-style test now available for property owners); Sharkey, supra note 57, at 1710–25,
1734, 1738–40 (analyzing recent Supreme Court opinions, concurrences, and dissents that
address administrative agencies overstepping authority and acknowledging that courts may
need to cooperate with federal agencies to usher in a new style of regulatory common law).
The Supreme Court has expressed concern with administrative agencies under the executive
branch blending legislative powers to write laws. Cf. Sharkey, supra note 57, at 1706–07 n.5
(providing various sources discussing how administrative agencies have used regulations to
dismantle state tort law).
102
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C. Flying Aerial Trespass Claims in Court
Property owners have a few options for filing aerial trespass claims. 106
They can use the Restatement to fashion a claim, sift through state statutes,
or swing for the fences in federal court.107 Section II.C.1 outlines common
law trespass claims under the Restatement (Second) of Torts.108 Section II.C.2
explains that some state statutes specifically address drone aerial
trespass.109 Section II.C.3 discusses how one federal court tip-toed around
drone aerial trespass.110
1.

Trespass under the Restatement (Second) of Torts

Trespass protects the right to exclude.111 To protect the right to
exclude, the Restatement offers two definitions for trespass: basic trespass
and aircraft trespass.112 Basic trespass to land requires intent to enter
another’s property without consent.113 Aircraft trespass requires an aerial
invasion into the immediate reaches that substantially interferes with the
land.114
Basic trespass requires: (1) intent; (2) entrance; and (3) lack of
consent.115 Intent requires only intent to enter, not intent to trespass. 116
106
See generally infra Sections II.C.1–II.C.3 (describing common law and statutory rights for
property owners).
107
See infra Sections II.C.1–II.C.3.
108
See infra Section II.C.1 (detailing the Restatement’s approach to basic trespass and aerial
trespass).
109
See infra Section II.C.2.
110
See infra Section II.C.3 (discussing a federal court case in which a man shot a hobby
drone out of the sky).
111
See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 49–50 (providing a detailed background
on the right to exclude, including how the right originated and evolved in early English
common law).
112
Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158 Liability for Intentional Intrusions on Land
(explaining basic trespass), with RESTATEMENT § 159 Intrusions Upon, Beneath, and Above
Surface of Earth (defining aircraft trespass).
113
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158(a)–(c), cmt. c.
114
See id. § 159(2). The Restatement excludes “space rockets, satellites, missiles, and similar
objects,” from aircraft. Id. Most jurisdictions classify drones as aircraft. See infra note 123
and accompanying text (citing authorities classifying drones as aircraft). See, e.g., IND. CODE
ANN. § 8–21–2–1 (Westlaw through 2018) (defining “aircraft” as “any contrivance . . . used
or designed for navigation of or flight in the air, except a parachute or other contrivance
designed for such navigation but used primarily as safety equipment”).
115
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158(a)–(c), cmt. c.
116
JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 119 (explaining “intent to be present” on the land as sufficient
without requiring intent to trespass). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158 cmt. b (stating
that using “enters land” is a convenient way of describing “not only coming upon land, but
also remaining on it, and in addition, to include the presence upon the land of a third person
or thing which the actor has caused to be or to remain there”).
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Entering without consent breaks the exclusion stick, creating a trespass. 117
Thus, entrance is the key.118
Entrance includes intentionally entering, remaining, failing to
remove, or causing entrance—like flying an object over the property.119 A
person trespasses simply by knowing the object will enter the land. 120
Entrance also includes entering over or under the property.121 However,
if an aircraft enters by flying over the property, the Restatement supplies a
different test.122
Drones are aircraft, and aircraft trespass requires an invasion of the
“immediate reaches” that “interferes substantially” with the property’s
use.123 The Restatement explains that federal laws control upper air, but
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158 cmt. c (“The word ‘intrusion’ . . . denote[s] the fact
that the possessor’s interest in the exclusive possession of his land has been invaded by the
presence of a person or thing upon it without the possessor’s consent.”). In other words,
entering without consent invades a property owner’s right to exclude. Id.
118
See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 119 (describing intent as “intent to be present” on the
land and that “intent to be present on someone else’s land is not necessary”). See also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158 cmt. c (noting the “land has been invaded by the presence
of a person or thing upon it without the [property owner’s] consent”).
119
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158(a)–(c), cmt. c (discussing varying degrees of
entrance that fall within the trespass definition, including mere presence without consent).
See also id. § 158 cmt. i (“The actor, without himself entering the land, may invade another’s
interest in its exclusive possession by throwing, propelling, or placing a thing either on or
beneath the surface of the land or in the air space above it.”). Even flying a kite or balloon
or shooting or propelling something above the property creates a trespass. See, e.g., id. § 158
cmt. i (highlighting that, without consent, “it is actionable trespass to throw rubbish on
another’s land . . . fire projectiles or to fly an advertising kite or balloon through the air above
it, even though no harm is done to the land”).
120
See id. § 158 cmt. i (“It is enough that an act is done with knowledge that it will to a
substantial certainty result in the entry of the foreign matter.”). See id. § 158 illus. 6 (“A, on
a public lake, intentionally discharges his shotgun over a point of land in B’s possession, near
the surface. The shot falls into the water on the other side. A is a trespasser.”). The actor
aggravates trespass by remaining on the property. See, e.g., id. § 158 cmt. l (“If the actor’s
entry was unprivileged, his remaining on the land may at the option of the [property owner]
be treated as an aggravation of the original trespass of entering the land . . . .”).
121
See infra note 122 and accompanying text (summarizing layers of trespass, including on,
over, and under land).
122
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158 cmt. g (“A trespass on land may be committed by
an intrusion upon the surface of the land or beneath or above the surface. (See § 159.)”); id.
§ 159 cmt. f (“Except as stated in Subsection (2), an unprivileged intrusion into the space
above the surface of the earth, at whatever height above the surface, is a trespass.”). Entering
airspace above land without consent creates a trespass, but if an aircraft enters, the test
changes. Compare RESTATEMENT § 158 cmt. g (finding trespass for surface, air, and subsurface
intrusions, and referencing § 159 for air intrusions by an aircraft), and RESTATEMENT § 159(1)
(including invasions on, above, or under the land as trespass, “[e]xcept as stated in
Subsection (2)”), with RESTATEMENT § 159 (2)(a)–(b) (outlining aircraft trespass).
123
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 159(2)(a)–(b) (finding aircraft trespass above property
“if, but only if, (a) it enters into the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and
(b) it interferes substantially with the other’s use and enjoyment of his land”). The
117
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property owners still enjoy some air exclusion rights. 124 Aircraft trespass
preserves the property’s immediate reaches to protect the owner from
aircraft invasions.125 Squeezing drones into ancient airplane laws
prompted legislative response in some states.126
2.

Aerial Trespass in State Statutes

Some state statutes aim at low-flying drones.127 Most target privacy
concerns, but a few hone in on aerial trespass, generally requiring: (1) a
Restatement explains aerial trespass by an aircraft does not consider “space rockets, satellites,
missiles, and similar objects.” Id. § 159 caveat. Multiple authorities conclude drones are
aircraft. See, e.g., FMRA, supra note 69 (calling all drones aircraft, whether public, civil, or
hobby); FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 5 (“In [FMRA] Congress confirmed the FAA’s
long-standing position that model aircraft are aircraft.”); Huerta v. Pirker, 2014 WL 8095629,
at *2–5 (NTSB 2014) (discussing the “[d]efinition of ‘aircraft,’” concluding that “an ‘aircraft’
is any device used for flight in the air,” and finding a hobby drone is an aircraft). See, e.g.,
IND. CODE § 8–21–4–1 (Westlaw through 2018) (“‘Aircraft’ includes balloon, airplane,
hydroplane, and every other vehicle used for navigation through the air. . . . While being
operated through the air otherwise than immediately above water, it shall be treated as an
aircraft.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.020(1) (Westlaw through 2017) (“‘Aircraft’ includes a
balloon, airplane, hydroplane, unmanned aerial vehicle and any other vehicle used for
navigation through the air.”); AZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3729(F)(7) (Westlaw through 2018)
(“Unmanned aircraft means an aircraft, including an aircraft commonly known as a drone,
that is operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the
aircraft.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 837.300(4) (Westlaw through 2018) (“‘Unmanned aircraft system’
means an unmanned flying machine, commonly known as a drone, and its associated
elements, including communication links and the components that control the machine.”).
But see IDAHO CODE § 21-213(1)(a)–(b) (Westlaw through 2018) (“For the purpose of this
section, the term ‘unmanned aircraft system’ (UAS) means an unmanned aircraft vehicle,
drone . . . . Unmanned aircraft system does not include: [m]odel flying airplanes . . . .”).
124
Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 159 cmt. i (citing Causby as granting “the upper
air, above the prescribed minimum altitudes of flight, a public highway” to be regulated by
federal law and that “private rights in the upper air no longer exist”), with RESTATEMENT
§ 159 cmt. j (referencing that Causby also gave “exclusive control of the immediate reaches of
the enveloping atmosphere” to property owners “to have full enjoyment of the land”).
125
See id. § 159 cmt. j (interpreting Causby’s finding “invasions of [the immediate reaches]
are in the same category as invasions of the surface,” as intending to “clearly [] preserve the
action of trespass as a remedy where the ‘immediate reaches’ are invaded by flight”).
Acknowledging Causby, the Restatement notes, “[t]he actual holding in [Causby] was that the
rights of the landowner were invaded, and there was a wrongful ‘taking’ of his property,
when the flights into the ‘immediate reaches’ of the air space substantially interfered with
his use of the land.” Id. § 159 cmt. k.
126
See infra Section II.C.2.
127
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CURRENT UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
STATE LAW LANDSCAPE [hereinafter NCSL] (June 25, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx
[https://perma.cc/K58E-6D8F] (reporting forty states have passed laws aiming at drones,
but most focus on improving privacy laws). See Darlene Ricker, Taking Flight, 103 A.B.A. J.
56, 62 (2017) (finding hundreds of drone regulation bills proposed in 2016). See also Terry
Carter, Federal Judge Overturns Massachusetts City Law Regulating Drones, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 22,
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height invasion; (2) a prior invasion, or two trespasses; and (3) a chase,
where the property owner must pursue the drone and warn the pilot.128
Experts cite Nevada and Oregon for giving property owners some rights
against drones.129
Nevada’s statute allows aerial trespass if the drone flies within 250
feet over the property, and the property owner follows the drone and tells
the pilot to keep out.130 If the drones flies below the 250-foot flight floor
again, the Nevada property owner may sue. 131 Oregon outlines similar

2017), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/federal_judge_overturns_massachusetts
_city_law_regulating_drones [https://perma.cc/C5YH-W9P3] (summarizing a city
ordinance on drone regulations struck down in federal court as preempted by the FAA). See,
e.g., Singer v. City of Newton, 284 F. Supp. 3d 125, 126–33 (D. Mass. 2017). In Singer, an
ordinance required drone registration with local government and restricted drones from
flying within 400 feet of the ground. Id. The court found the ordinance preempted by FAA
regulations, which already required federal registration and allowed flight within 400 feet of
the ground. Id.
128
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(1)(a)–(b) (requiring two invasions within 250 feet
above the property and an owner warning) (Westlaw through 2017); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 837.380(1)(a)–(b) (Westlaw through 2018) (permitting an action if the drone invades twice
and the owner warned the pilot to stop); Ricker, supra note 127, at 62 (stipulating that Part
107’s failure to address privacy concerns led to over 280 state and local drone regulation bill
proposals in 2016 and arguing the variance may make air unsafe). The impact of drones on
privacy laws is outside this Note’s scope. See, e.g., Milos, supra note 4, at 44–55 (focusing on
drones and privacy laws as a major concern); Kohler, supra note 61, at 174–76 (explaining
states and cities are enacting privacy laws because federal privacy laws for drones are
absent); Connot & Zummo, supra note 24, at 17 (stating the FAA left privacy laws for state
and local governments). States also provide varying commercial drone exceptions. Id.
(acknowledging states have taken measures to balance privacy and commercial interests).
See, e.g., infra Part III.B (explaining how varying statutory language creates aerial obstacle
courses for interstate drones). But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a) (Westlaw through 2018)
(blending privacy with trespass and finding liability when entering and capturing a “visual
image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private,
personal, or familial activity and the invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a
reasonable person”).
129
See, e.g., Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 172 (pointing out Nevada and Oregon for
giving property owners some rights against drones); Kristen G. Juras, The Game of Drones:
Federal and State Rules of Play and Their Intersect with Property Law, 34 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW.,
no. 3, 2017, at 23, 29 (noting Nevada and Oregon statutes).
130
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103 (creating a trespass action for drones); id. § 493.103(1)
(allowing a property owner to “bring an action for trespass against the owner or operator of
an unmanned aerial vehicle that is flown at a height of less than 250 feet over the property”);
id. § 493.103(1)(b) (requiring the property owner “notif[y] the owner or operator of the
[drone] that the [property owner] did not authorize the flight of the unmanned aerial vehicle
over the property at a height of less than 250 feet”). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 7,
§ 159 cmt. l (reporting immediate reaches likely falls between fifty and 500 feet, and a 150foot invasion is unclear).
131
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(1)(a) (allowing aerial trespass if the drone pilot has flown
the drone “over the property at a height of less than 250 feet on at least one previous
occasion”). Exceptions to the statute include business drones licensed with the FAA that
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pursue-and-evict laws.132 Other state statutes label drones, but most states
simply lack aerial trespass statutes. 133 Without uniform aerial trespass
guideposts, claims leak all over American courtrooms.134

operate within the scope of the business and “do[] not unreasonably interfere with the
existing use of the real property.” Id. § 493.103(2)(d)(1)–(3).
132
See OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380. In Oregon, the first element of drone aerial trespass
requires a drone to fly “over the property.” Id. § 837.380(1). Initially, Oregon required an
invasion “at a height of less than 400 feet,” but the legislature deleted this language from the
statute. See Aircraft—Unmanned Aircraft—Generally, 2015, ch. 315, sec. 11, § 837.380(1)(a)–
(b), 2015 Or. Sess. Law 2354 (West) (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380(1)(a)–(b))
(deleting a 400-foot flight floor from the statute). The second element requires a positive
action by the property owner, who must find the drone pilot and notify the pilot to keep out.
See OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380(1)(b) (requiring that the property owner, after one invasion,
“notif[y] the owner or operator of the unmanned aircraft system that the [property owner]
did not want the [drone] flown over the property”). Finally, the same drone must invade
again. See id. § 837.380(1)(a) (stating the drone must fly “over the property on at least one
previous occasion”). Commercial exceptions in Oregon reflect those authorized by the FAA.
See id. § 837.380(3) (exempting drones used for “commercial purposes in compliance with
authorization granted by the [FAA]”).
133
See NCSL, supra note 127 (reporting most state laws targeting drones focus on defining
drones and authorizing public uses). See Timothy M. Ravich, Airports, Droneports, and the
New Urban Airspace, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587, 604 (2017) (“[N]ot every state has enacted
drone specific laws.”). See also id. at 605–06 (explaining many state laws simply defer to
federal laws and regulations). See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1–8–1 (Westlaw through 2018)
(stating only Rhode Island may regulate its drones, without including any property owner
rights); UTAH CODE ANN. § 72–14–104, 403(7)(a)–(b) (effective May 9, 2017) (deferring to the
FAA for commercial drone restrictions and writing general hobby drones laws mimicking
FAA commercial drone regulations). See, e.g., Johnathan Rupprecht, US Drone Laws,
(2017),
https://jrupprechtlaw.com/drone-laws-state
JRUPPRECHTLAW.COM
[https://perma.cc/3S65-DW5H] (providing an excellent interactive website with a
compound list of general state drone regulation statutes).
134
See Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 140–41 (listing drone conflicts like bothering
sunbathers and sports stadiums, soaring into houses and over parades, and eluding to selfhelp attempts to clip drones from the air). See also Ravich, supra note 133, at 604 (pointing
out the patchwork of regulations below national airspace). While a Nevada property owner
may have statutory guidance for aerial trespass, a Kentucky property owner may have to
resort to using the Restatement. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103 (enumerating drone aerial
trespass), with Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, 2017 WL 1088093 (W.D. Ky. Mar.
21, 2017) (order granting motion to dismiss) (suggesting drone aerial trespass may require
an “unreasonable” interference with the land, similar to the Restatement’s language).
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Flying Aerial Trespass Claims in Court

Drone claims continue to invade state and federal courts.135 While
most claims vary from trespass to privacy violations, a recent case tip-toed
into aerial trespass limbo.136
In Boggs v. Merideth, Boggs flew a drone above Merideth’s property,
and Merideth shot it down with a shotgun.137 Boggs claimed trespass to
chattels and sued in federal court, arguing federal question jurisdiction
because the drone was a federal aircraft flying in federal airspace.138 The
135
See Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 140–41 (describing several specific instances of
tort-like drone claims); Hillary B. Farber, Keep Out! The Efficacy of Trespass, Nuisance and
Privacy Torts as Applied to Drones, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 384–86 (2017) (detailing the
jurisdictional collision between state and federal rights to regulate low airspace). A Kansas
man spotted a drone hovering outside his daughter’s window and called police. Id. at 385.
A drone in Miami spied on a woman breastfeeding on an apartment balcony, close enough
for her to “swat.” Id. A Seattle drone perched mid-air outside a woman’s twenty-sixth floor
apartment, watching her change clothes. Id. New York cops busted drones for using
cameras to peek through windows of newspapers and medical facilities. Id. See also cases
cited infra note 210 (citing federal cases involving drones). See, e.g., Boggs v. Merideth, No.
3:16-CV-00006-TBR, 2017 WL 1088093 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2017) (finding lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over a trespass to chattels claim involving a drone but still discussing drone
aerial trespass as a potential counterclaim for the defendant).
136
See Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 136–37, 140–41 (detailing various drone claims);
Farber, supra note 135, at 385 (mentioning many reports of drones peeking through
windows). See also Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, at 15–16, 2017 WL 1088093
(W.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2017) (explaining some difficulties with bringing drone aerial trespass,
despite the cause of action being trespass to chattels). The court ultimately dismissed the
claim for trespass to chattels for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but highlighted other
issues like aerial trespass and whether property owners or the FAA hold rights to low
airspace. Id. at 7–12, 15–16.
137
See Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, at 1, 2017 WL 1088093 (W.D. Ky. Mar.
21, 2017) (explaining “Defendant Merideth shot down Boggs’ unmanned aircraft, or ‘drone,’
with a shotgun”). Following the federal court ruling, Defendant Merideth nicknamed
himself “the droneslayer” and sold shirts. See Miriam McNabb, The Kentucky “Drone Slayer”
Case Dismissed, DRONE LIFE (Mar. 22, 2017), https://dronelife.com/2017/03/22/kentuckydrone-slayer-case-dismissed/ [https://perma.cc/LG3W-4PMK]. See also Miriam McNabb,
Drone Slayer T-shirt, DRONE LIFE (Jan. 21, 2016), https://dronelife.com/2016/01/21/whythe-drone-slayer-matters/drone-slayer-t-shirt/ [https://perma.cc/NLE8-R55N] (providing
a picture of the shirt, with the front saying “Team Willie,” and the back saying
“#DRONESLAYER” and “We the People . . . have had enough!”).
138
See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages ¶ 3, Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16CV-00006-TBR (W.D. Ky. Jan. 4, 2016). Boggs claims his “right to relief as well as the
defendant’s defenses, will necessarily require resolution of a substantial question of federal
law,” including “the boundaries of the airspace surrounding real property, the reasonable
expectation of privacy as viewed from the air, and the right to damage or destroy an aircraft
in-flight, in relation to the exclusive federal regulation and protection of air safety, air
navigation, and control over the national airspace.” Id. See also id. ¶ 12 (reporting that
criminal charges were initially filed for “felony wanton endangerment and criminal
mischief” but dismissed because “[d]efendant ‘had a right to shoot’ at the aircraft”). Boggs
alleged the “aircraft” fell under federal laws and flew in United States jurisdiction, “not
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court dismissed the complaint as a state tort claim cloaked by a federal
question.139
Before dismissal, the court considered whether any federal issues
lingered for Defendant Merideth.140 After a quick glance at aerial trespass,
the court found no federal question.141 The court refused to draw a line
between Merideth’s property and federal airspace and determined that
any drone aerial trespass claim would require showing the drone
“unreasonabl[y] interfered with” the use of the property.142 The court
resisted the temptation to dive into aerial trespass but noted that the

within Defendant’s property.” Id. ¶ 25(A), (C). Merideth did not address this argument, and
the court found a response unnecessary because no subject matter jurisdiction existed. See
Boggs, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, at 6–7.
139
See Boggs, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, at 5–6 (reiterating “a federal question must appear
on the face of the complaint” (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398–99
(1987))). The court found “the heart of Boggs’ claim is one for damage to his unmanned
aircraft under Kentucky state law.” Id. at 10. Further, even if the drone was a federal aircraft
flying in federal airspace, any relevant claims remain “garden-variety state tort” claims, and
Boggs could not gain federal question jurisdiction by anticipating and rebutting Merideth’s
defense in the complaint. See Boggs, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, at 7 (quoting Hampton v. R.J.
Corman R.R. Switching Co., 683 F.3d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 2012)). See also id., at 5–6 (finding
“Boggs not only anticipates Merideth’s potential defense that his conduct was privileged due
to a need to protect his property, but [Boggs] goes one step further and anticipates his own
response to that potential defense” (emphasis omitted)). The court continued that despite
Boggs’ claims the FAA governs his drone and the air involved, if the FAA has any interest,
it is limited. See id. at 8 (“[A]lthough the FAA certainly has an interest in enforcing its
regulations governing federal airspace, its interest in applying those regulations in the
context of a state law tort claim for trespass to chattels is limited or nonexistent.”).
140
See Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, at 14, 2017 WL 1088093 (W.D. Ky. Mar.
21, 2017) (“With regard to potential coercive actions that Merideth could bring, two causes
of action appear plausible to the Court based on the declaratory relief Boggs seeks.”). The
court found potential claims for “invasion of privacy and trespass, both tort claims under
Kentucky law.” Id.
141
See Boggs, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, at 14, 16 (“Rather, these hypothetical [trespass and
invasion of privacy] claims would sound in ‘garden-variety state tort’ law.” (quoting
Hampton, 683 F.3d at 712)). Generally, the court found drone tort claims were not federal
court issues. See id., at 9 (reporting that other federal courts “expressed serious skepticism
as to whether all unmanned aircrafts are subject to FAA regulation” (quoting Huerta v.
Haughwout, No. 3:16-cv-358 (JAM), 2016 WL 3919799, at *4 (D. Conn. July 18, 2016)).
142
See Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, at 15–16 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2017)
(“Specifically, as with Boggs’ trespass to chattels claim, whether Boggs’ aircraft was on
Merideth’s property or federal property is not significant to the federal system as a whole.”
(citing Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1066 (2013))). Most importantly, the court appeared
to point at the Restatement, or at least common law aircraft trespass, by stating, “if a court
determined that Boggs’ aircraft was flying on Merideth’s property, those claims would still
require a determination of whether any such intrusion was ‘unreasonable’ or interfered with
Merideth’s possession or control of his land.” Compare id., at 15–16, with RESTATEMENT, supra
note 7, § 159 (requiring aircraft trespass claims only if the aircraft invades the “immediate
reaches” and “interferes substantially” with the property’s use).
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Restatement’s aircraft trespass test places a burden on property owners
launching aerial trespass claims.143
III. ANALYSIS
Courts must define aerial trespass to protect property owners from
drone invasions.144 Aerial trespass claims tank in courtrooms because the
tests soar beyond basic trespass and crash near nuisance and taking. 145
Property rights are vanishing as new aerial trespass laws that require
nuisance-type analysis replace basic trespass principles.146 Part III.A takes
off with the Restatement’s failure to cover drone aerial trespass.147 Part III.B
soars over states with drone aerial trespass statutes and through the holes
in each.148 Part III.C slices into pieces of aerial trespass tangled up in
potential federal issues.149
143
See supra note 142 and accompanying text (highlighting how the court’s language in
Boggs clearly resembles the language used in the Restatement’s test for aircraft trespass). See,
e.g., Boggs, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, at 15–16 (determining even if Boggs invaded Merideth’s
property, the drone must also unreasonably interfere with Merideth’s use of his property).
144
See Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 170 (reporting that most states do not have laws
defining property owner airspace to prevent unwanted drone invasions).
145
See supra Parts II.A, II.C. Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158(a)–(c), cmt. c
(defining basic trespass as intent to enter another’s property without consent), with
RESTATEMENT § 159(1)–(2) (providing a different test for aircraft trespass, which requires an
invasion of the property’s immediate reaches that substantially interferes with the use and
enjoyment of property), and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S 256, 264–67 (1946) (finding
aircraft that invaded immediate reaches and substantially interfered with property created a
constitutional taking requiring just compensation), and JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 878
(distinguishing trespass from nuisance). While trespass and nuisance both protect land
interests, trespass requires an entrance and does not require actual damages. JOHNSON, supra
note 39, at 878. However, nuisance does not require an entrance and needs substantial harm.
Id.
146
See discussion infra Parts III.A–III.C (describing how trespass began as protecting a
property owner’s right to exclude, but today’s aerial trespass tests give drones a privilege to
invade private property); supra Part II.A (discussing the property column and its bundle of
rights). For example, the Restatement’s aircraft trespass test uses a takings test used by the
Causby Court in 1946. See infra Part III.A (applying the Restatement’s approach to aircraft
trespass to drones). Furthermore, states writing aerial trespass statutes require the property
owner to pursue and evict the drone pilot and require two invasions. See infra Part III.B
(elaborating on state legislatures’ one-free-pass and pursue-and-evict laws).
147
See infra Part III.A (analyzing how the Restatement’s trespass tests fail to protect property
owners from unwanted drone invasions because drones, as aircraft, require a heightened
level of interference with property).
148
See infra Part III.B (pointing out how state statutes addressing aerial trespass by drones
fail to protect property owners from drones because height limitations are unclear and laws
presume a privilege to invade property once and fall far from the traditional principles that
defined trespass to protect the property owner’s right to exclude).
149
See infra Part III.C (describing why federal courts do not want drone aerial trespass
claims, and the FAA is not authorized to write aerial trespass laws, despite claiming control
over all the air and all the drones).
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A. Drones Defeat Aerial Trespass under the Dull Axe of the Restatement
Drones beat both basic land trespass and aircraft trespass under the
Restatement because drones are aircraft.150 Trespass protects the right to
exclude, so an unauthorized entrance creates a trespass.151 However,
entrance by an object and entrance by an aircraft receive different
treatment.152 While aerial invasions by objects like kites and balloons fall
under basic land trespass, aerial invasions by drones fly into aircraft
trespass.153 Aircraft trespass requires a drone to invade the immediate
reaches and substantially interfere with the property’s use. 154 Drones do
not fit into the aircraft trespass test because the test derives from a takings

150
The Restatement does not explicitly call drones aircraft. However, federal authorities
consider drones aircraft. Similarly, state statutes, whether addressing drone aerial trespass
or not, tend to agree that drones are aircraft. See supra note 123 and accompanying text
(listing multiple federal authorities that define drones as aircraft).
151
See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 118–19 (defining trespass to land as “intentionally and
without consent or privilege enter[ing] on, under, or above the land of another,” and
describing how the trespass elements rely on an initial entrance and only require an intent
to enter the land, not an intent to trespass). See also discussion supra notes 33–38 (elaborating
on the genesis of trespass, the bundle of sticks, and the right to exclude); discussion supra
notes 115–18 (explaining how entrance is key to trespass because entrance encompasses both
intent and lack of consent). Again, the Restatement clearly defines basic trespass to land.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158(a)–(c), cmt. c (stating trespass is intentionally entering,
remaining, or failing to remove from land).
152
See supra Section II.C.1 (discussing how drones are aircraft and subject to the
Restatement’s aircraft trespass test, not the basic land trespass test). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT,
supra note 7, § 158, cmt. i (illustrating varying degrees of entry onto another’s property that
fall within the definition of trespass, including an object like a kite or balloon propelled over
land); id. § 158, cmt. g (noting trespass includes aerial trespass and citing § 159 for aerial
invasions); id. § 159 (defining aircraft trespass and using a different test than § 158 uses for
objects like kites and balloons).
153
See supra note 123 and accompanying text (supplying multiple federal and state
authorities establishing drones as aircraft). Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158, cmt. i
(illustrating various aerial invasions that create trespass without the actor physically
entering the land, such as when the actor causes something else, like a balloon or kite, to
enter the air above the land), with RESTATEMENT § 158, cmt. g (referring to § 159 for aerial
trespass), and RESTATEMENT § 159(2) (applying a different trespass test for aircraft flying over
property).
154
See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing how a trespassing aircraft
changes the test). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 159(1)–(2).
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test that was first applied to a manned aircraft.155 Thus, aircraft trespass
requires a taking.156 A trespass is not a taking.157
Property owners should not lose the right to keep drones off their
property merely because a drone has not seriously and frequently invaded
the property to the point that the invasion rises to a constitutional
taking.158 As an initial matter, immediate reaches remains undefined. 159
Furthermore, substantial interference blends nuisance with trespass—two

155
See supra Parts II.A, II.C. Compare United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264–67 (1946)
(holding planes flying over a farm that invaded the immediate reaches of the farm and
substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of property constituted a taking), with
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 159(1)–(2) (explaining aerial trespass and how aircraft
invasions change the test), and RESTATEMENT § 159(2) (applying Causby’s immediate reaches
and substantial interference elements as requirements for pursuing an aerial trespass claim
against an aircraft).
156
Compare Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–67 (finding a taking when planes flew into the
immediate reaches of a chicken farm and substantially interfered with the farm’s use), with
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 159(1)–(2) (requiring an aircraft to invade the immediate
reaches and substantially interfere with the property’s use to constitute an aircraft trespass).
157
See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 49–58 (explaining that trespass allows the
right to exclude others from property while taking establishes the right to keep and use
property without the government seizing that property for public use without compensating
the owner). A trespass is so far from a taking, the two are completely different chapters in
the property playbook. Id. The reason for this takings test application may be that property
rights collided with airspace in the 1940s and the two were never untangled. See supra Part
II.A (elaborating on the collision between old English property rights that extended toward
heaven and how planes trimmed those rights down to an undefined altitude today). Still,
under aircraft trespass, theoretically, a single drone invasion must rise to a government-style
taking of the property to create an actionable trespass. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V
(stating that private property taken for public use requires just compensation), and
SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 925 (pointing out that a taking is either seizing land
for public use or seizing property by restricting the owner’s rights), with RESTATEMENT, supra
note 7, § 158(a)–(c), cmt. c (addressing trespass as intent to enter another’s property without
consent), and JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 118–19 (describing trespass as intentionally entering
another’s property without consent and that intent to enter only requires “intent to be
present” on the property).
158
See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 49–58 (differentiating between the right to
use and exclude); supra notes 152–57 and accompanying text (comparing the Restatement’s
test for aerial trespass by an aircraft to the takings test used in Causby). See also infra note 160
and accompanying text (splicing nuisance from trespass).
159
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 159 cmt. l (“‘Immediate reaches’ of the land has not
been defined as yet, except to mean that ‘the aircraft flights were at such altitudes as to
interfere substantially with the landowner’s possession and use of the airspace above the
surface.’ No more definite line can be drawn than is suggested by the word ‘immediate.’”).
According to the Restatement, 500 feet is outside immediate reaches, fifty feet is inside
immediate reaches, and middle measurements, like 150 feet, are unclear. Id.
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claims that protect completely different property rights. 160 Fortunately,
states are trying to sharpen these dull laws.161
B. Drones Beat Blacksmiths Inside State Legislatures
Drones avoid aerial trespass statutes because states with statutes align
drone invasions with nuisance, not trespass. 162 States borrow broken
Restatement rules instead of building from basic trespass laws designed to

160
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 159 cmt. m (“Even though the flight is not within the
‘immediate reaches’ of the air space, it may still unreasonably interfere with the use and
enjoyment of the land. In such a case the liability will rest upon the basis of nuisance rather
than trespass.”). Trespass protects the right to exclude and is not limited to protecting only
an owner’s right to exclude nuisances. See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 878 (discussing how
trespass protects the right to exclude, while nuisance protects the right to use and enjoy
property). Trespass and nuisance are further distinguishable because “[t]respass requires
entry above, under, or onto the land in question, but typically does not require . . . actual
damages.” Id. On the other hand, nuisance “does not require entry, but substantial harm
must be shown.” Id. Absorbing aircraft trespass into nuisance would absorb part of the
exclusion stick into part of the right-to-use stick, arguably destroying the most essential stick
in the bundle of property rights. See, e.g., supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text
(explaining the bundle of sticks, including the right to use and exclude, and emphasizing the
right to exclude as an essential stick). Even a leading expert in the field, Troy A. Rule, agrees
that “most states rely upon vague, nuisance-like balancing tests to address conflicts between
flying objects and landowners.” Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 170. See also Ian Ayres,
Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 828–29 (1998) (calling nuisance
“muddier” than trespass because nuisance requires “more of a cost-benefit” analysis,
whereas trespass acts as a more “bright-line ‘rule’”).
161
See NCSL, supra note 127 (offering a comprehensive list of recently passed drone
legislation organized by state). See infra Part III.B (dissecting state statutes addressing drone
aerial trespass). See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103 (providing statutory guidelines for aerial
trespass); OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380 (listing elements similar to Nevada for aerial trespass
claims).
162
See supra note 160 and accompanying text (noting that trespass and nuisance protect
different property rights and how experts agree that state statutes use tests similar to
nuisance, not trespass). See also Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 170 (finding many states
use “vague, nuisance-like balancing tests to address conflicts between flying objects and
landowners”); sources cited supra note 127 (providing multiple sources that cite state laws
and local ordinances and explaining how some are not surviving judicial review). See also,
e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(1)(a)–(b) (requiring two drone invasions within 250 feet of the
property before a property owner can sue for aerial trespass); OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380(1)(a)–
(b) (stating a drone must invade another’s property twice before an owner can sue for aerial
trespass).
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protect the right to exclude.163 State laws: (1) lack intent; (2) dismiss
consent; and (3) create aerial obstacle courses.164
First, aerial trespass statutes eliminate a crucial element from trespass:
intent.165 Trespass is an intentional tort and is immediately actionable. 166
However, aerial trespass statutes require two drone invasions, suggesting
aerial trespass is not intentional until the second invasion.167 Battery is not
the second time you swing the bat.168

163
See supra Parts II.B, II.C. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(1)(a)–(b) (defining aerial
trespass as a 250-foot invasion that occurs twice and the property owner must notify the
drone pilot to stop flying over the land), and RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 159(2)(a)–(b)
(describing aircraft trespass as an invasion of immediate reaches that substantially interferes
with use and enjoyment of property), with SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 49–50
(explaining that property owners use trespass to protect the right to exclude and any
intentional entry without consent constitutes trespass), and RESTATEMENT § 158, cmt. c
(noting any invasion without consent creates a trespass).
164
See discussion infra notes 165–184 (arguing aerial trespass statutes remove intent and
consent from basic trespass by requiring two drone invasions and a hostile showing by the
property owner, and statutes add vague flight floors and conflicting rules and exceptions).
165
See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing Nevada and Oregon statutes
defining drone aerial trespass and mentioning that experts routinely cite to both state
statutes). See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(1)(a)–(b) (defining drone trespass as an invasion
within 250 feet above the property after the drone operator previously invaded the property
and the property owner told the drone operator to stop).
166
See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 43, 118 (defining trespass to land, including above the
land, as a basic intentional tort and that satisfying intent only requires an “intent to be
present,” not intent to trespass); SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 50 (finding “the
defendant acts intentionally if he voluntarily enters onto the land,” regardless of intent to
trespass, bad faith, or good faith). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 7 cmt. a (reporting
“any intrusion upon land in the possession of another is an injury, and, if not privileged,
gives rise to a cause of action”).
167
See supra note 128 and accompanying text. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(1)(a).
Thus, aerial trespass statutes, at minimum, lower the traditional trespass intent requirement
from intentional to reckless, if not completely reframe the analysis to that of nuisance.
Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158 (stating that the intentional tort of trespass only
requires a one-time intentional entry upon land without consent), with JOHNSON, supra note
39, at 17 (describing reckless tortious conduct as either heightened lack of care or conscious
indifference), and JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 878 (discussing the difference between nuisance,
which protects the right to use and enjoy property and requires substantial harm, and
trespass).
168
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 8A cmt. a (explaining intent as a “reference to the
consequences of an act rather than the act itself”). See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 58
(describing battery as intentional, harmful, unconsented, bodily contact). For example,
hitting a drone pilot with a baseball bat one time is still actionable battery after the first
swing, regardless of the number of subsequent swings taken. Compare id. (drawing a
comparison between trespass and battery as both being immediately actionable), with supra
Part I (referencing a drone pilot flying a drone over sunbathing girls). Similarly, one air
invasion should create an actionable trespass, regardless of the number of subsequent
invasions or property owner actions following the first invasion.
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Second, aerial trespass statutes erase consent. 169 By requiring the
property owner to pursue and evict the drone pilot after one invasion, and
demanding a subsequent invasion, statutes hand drones a free pass to
invade property.170 Free pass laws grant drones invasion privileges until
property owners exhibit hostile showings over their own property. 171
Allowing drones an automatic privilege to hover over each house on the
block until told otherwise defies trespass by violating the right to
exclude.172 Trespass is intent to enter the property, period.173 Trespass is
not intent to enter after entering once and getting chased off. 174 Free pass
laws contradict traditional consent requirements by taking privileges
from the hands of property owners.175

See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(1)(a)–(b) (finding actionable aerial trespass if a drone
flew over property “on at least one previous occasion” and the property owner “notified the
owner or operator of the unmanned aerial vehicle that the [property owner] did not
authorize the flight of the [drone] over the property at a height of less than 250 feet”); OR.
REV. STAT. § 837.380(1)(a)–(b) (requiring, after one prior invasion, the property owner to
“notif[y] the owner or operator of the unmanned aircraft system that the [property owner]
d[oes] not want the unmanned aircraft system flown over the property”). Trespass involves
an “intrusion” or an invasion without consent. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158, cmt. c.
State statutes replace consent with a statutory privilege for drones traditionally given by “the
possessor of land,” not by state law. Id.
170
After one invasion, states require the property owner to find the owner of the drone
and tell the pilot not to fly over the property anymore. See sources cited supra note 169
(reporting that state statutes grant drones a privilege to invade property until the property
owner tells the drone pilot otherwise).
171
State statutes that require the property owner to hunt down the drone pilot to exclude
the drone from the property effectively asks the property owner to show the adverse and
hostile element of adverse possession. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(1)(a)–(b) (requiring
the property owner to inform the drone pilot that flying is forbidden above the property),
with SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 116 (stating that some courts require adverse
possessors to show “a claim of right” to gain title to the land to fulfill the element of adverse
and hostile).
172
See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (discussing the right to exclude as one of
the essential sticks in a property owner’s bundle of rights).
173
See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 119 (explaining that mistaken entry is no defense to
trespass because intent to be present on the land is all that is necessary).
174
See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 157, 159–60 (Wis. 1997)
(finding punitive damages were not excessive when a business delivered a mobile home
across private property, after the property owners told the business not to cross the property,
because the right to exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property” and exclusive enjoyment of property is a
constitutional right).
175
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158 cmt. i (“Thus, in the absence of the possessor’s
consent . . . it is an actionable trespass to throw rubbish on another’s land, even though he
himself uses it as a dump heap, or to fire projectiles or to fly an advertising kite or balloon
through the air above it, even though no harm is done to the land or to the possessor’s
enjoyment of it.”). See also id. § 158 cmt. c (describing the traditional no consent rule).
169
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Finally, state statutes create aerial obstacle courses.176 First, states
replace the Restatement’s “immediate reaches” with equally vague phrases
like “over the property” and within a “structure,” without clarifying the
exact point a drone pierces the property and creates an invasion. 177
176
See Final Rule, supra note 98, at 42,194 (suggesting states consult the FAA before writing
flight altitude restrictions because airspace may become unsafe otherwise). For example, the
FAA’s drone dome allows drones (purportedly commercial drones) to fly anywhere, up to
“400 feet above ground level, unless the [drone]” flies within 400 feet “of a structure” and
stays within 400 feet of “the structure’s immediate uppermost limit.” 14 C.F.R.
§ 107.51(b)(1)–(2) (2016). Utah uses similar language, deferring to FAA regulations for
commercial drones, and only restricting hobby drones from flying “at an altitude that is
higher than 400 feet above ground level.” UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 72–14–104, 403(7)(a)–(b)
(effective May 9, 2017). Basically, Utah drones can fly within 400 feet of the ground, but if
the drone gets close to a structure, the drone needs to fly higher, but not too high. Id.
Nevada, on the other hand, places a hardline flight floor “250 feet over the property” to
insulate property owners. NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(1)(a)–(b). However, if the drone is a
commercial drone, Nevada allows the commercial drone to fly over private property if the
use is within the scope of the business and “does not unreasonably interfere with the existing
use of the real property.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(2)(d)(3). Thus, a drone flying across the
Utah-Nevada border must figure out if it qualifies as a commercial drone, which gains a
more flexible flight path so long as the drone avoids every “structure” within 400 feet of the
flight path—any structures require the drone fly higher in Utah, but not Nevada. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 72–14–104; NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(2)(d). However, if the drone pilot
determines the drone is not a commercial drone and must comply with hobby drone flight
rules, the drone must bob and weave through these conflicting statutory altitudes and stay
within 400 feet of the ground or a structure while in Utah but must adjust to an altitude of
250 feet above the ground the moment it crosses into Nevada. UTAH CODE ANN. § 72–14–
403(7)(a)–(b); NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(1)(a)–(b). Additionally, other states define
commercial purposes differently, and may require similar acrobatic maneuvers. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–3729(F)(2) (declaring “[c]ommercial purpose[]” as any drone use “for
financial compensation and includes aerial photography, aerial mapping or geospatial
imaging” under Arizona’s criminal statute prohibiting certain operations); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1708.8(a), (b), (d), (k) (Westlaw through 2018) (defining commercial purpose as “any act
done with the expectation of a sale, financial gain, or other consideration” including images,
sounds, or other physical impressions “intended to be, or was in fact sold, published, or
transmitted,” and any commercial drone invasion results in heightened fines); TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 423.002(a) (effective Sept. 1, 2017) (enumerating several permissible
commercial and public uses for drone imaging including education, military, mapping,
utility, law enforcement, government, disaster, rescue, real estate, port surveillance and
security, land survey, engineering practices, insurance, and any use approved by the FAA);
OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380(3) (deferring all permissible “commercial purposes” drone uses to
those permitted by the FAA). See also Ricker, supra note 127, at 62 (explaining the variance
in over 280 state and local drone regulation bills proposed in 2016 may lead to unsafe use of
airspace). Some states still lack aerial trespass statutes. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1–8–1
(stating, generally, that Rhode Island has “exclusive legal authority to regulate [drones],”
without specifying any rights for property owners against unwanted drone invasions or any
other causes of action). For more state differences, see Rupprecht, supra note 133 (providing
a comprehensive list of state drone statutes on an interactive website).
177
See OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380(1)(a)–(b) (preventing drones from flying “over the
property” without pinpointing “property”). States writing flight floors failed to define if the
flight floor starts from the ground, the house, the immediate reaches, or the tallest tree. Id.
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Second, contradicting state flight floors require interstate drones to
perform aerial gymnastics.178 When flight floors vary, efficient aerial

(failing to clarify limits on flight altitude restrictions above property); UTAH CODE ANN. § 72–
14–403(7)(a)–(b) (allowing flight within 400 feet of a structure, without defining structure);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103(1)(a)–(b) (requiring an invasion “250 feet over the property”
without defining if property means the ground or includes a structure or tree). Nevada
provides a flight floor of “250 feet over the property,” but the exact measuring point is
unclear. Id. Thus, aerial trespass statutes leave the same gaping definitional holes as the
Restatement. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 159 cmt. l (noting “immediate reaches”
remains undefined, but “flight at 500 feet or more above the surface is not within the
‘immediate reaches,’ while flight within 50 feet, which interferes with actual use, clearly is,
and flight within 150 feet, which also so interferes, may present a question of fact”). Placing
a vertical height restriction requires connecting the line between a trespassing drone and the
invaded property. See Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, supra note 23, at 188 (discussing
how laws need to define low-altitude property rights to “simplify aerial trespass and takings
claims involving drones”). See BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at 209–10 (calling every
unauthorized entry onto property actionable for breaching the property owner’s “close”).
See, e.g., Farber, supra note 135, at 385 (reporting a Seattle woman “saw a drone hovering
outside her window on the twenty-sixth floor while she was getting dressed”). For example,
if a 100-foot flight floor began at ground level, a resident on the twenty-fifth floor would
have no protection against aerial trespass. Id. The FAA defines an obstruction as “[a]ny
object of natural growth, terrain, or permanent or temporary construction or alteration,
including equipment or materials used and any permanent or temporary apparatus,” and
includes alterations to any of those obstructions. 14 C.F.R. § 77.13 (2016). States could use
the FAA’s definition for obstruction to clarify structure for the purposes of aerial trespass
while showing deference to the FAA. Id. See, e.g., Final Rule, supra note 98, at 42,194 (warning
states to consult the FAA before writing low-altitude laws). Regardless, flight floors need
precision to clarify property rights and filter claims from polluting courtrooms. See Rule,
Airspace in an Age of Drones, supra note 23, at 188 (explaining the need for more precise lines
between property rights and federal airspace, which may need to extend up to 500 feet, or
navigable airspace, although this article was published before Part 107). Professor Rule
provides an excellent example of a futuristic look at some advanced altitude restrictions that
include city, state, and federal jurisdictions, as well as variations for rural and urban areas.
See, e.g., Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 161–84. For instance, in large cities, states may
decide to implement a block-by-block approach and prohibit drone flight on certain highrise blocks. Id. As Professor Rule points out, flight heights for drones will certainly vary
depending on topographic composition of the state or city. Id.
178
See FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF
UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS
(UAS)
FACT
SHEET
(Dec.
17,
2015),
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/uas_regulations_policy/media/uas_fact_sheet_final
.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP53-2PWW] (reasoning “[s]ubstantial air safety issues are raised
when state or local governments attempt to regulate the operation or flight of aircraft” and
such “fractionalized control of the navigable airspace” could result in a “‘patchwork quilt’
of differing restrictions [that] could severely limit the flexibility of FAA in controlling the
airspace and flight patterns, and ensuring safety and an efficient air traffic flow”). See also
Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 151, 155 (citing the FAA’s “patchwork quilt” theory and
later arguing that drone regulations varying across localities may be similar to the standard
variance in local traffic laws for automobiles).
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navigation becomes impossible. 179 The result creates an aerial obstacle
course for drones that parallels aeromodelling. 180
Part III has officially gone from basic trespass to aeromodelling. 181
Aerial trespass is not rocket science and should not inflate trespass laws
to require a taking, force a hostile showing by the property owner, or give
drones a privilege to invade.182 Yet both state statutes and the Restatement
fail to leave property owners space to swing their exclusion sticks.183 With

179
See supra note 176 and accompanying text (explaining how a drone may need to
maneuver to higher altitudes upon crossing state borders where flight floors and structural
restrictions vary). States will likely puzzle different regulations and flight floors together
because state topographies, populations, and industries are unique. See Connot & Zummo,
supra note 24, at 16 (arguing states, not the federal government, must address certain drone
operations based on the unique characteristics of each state, like topography and whether
the cities within states are more rural or urban). However, a more manageable approach
may exist. See, e.g., Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 161–85 (breaking down a
comprehensive plan that allows federal, state, and local governments to share airspace in a
detailed drone regulation system); Kelsey Atherton, The Future of Urban Planning: Zoning for
Drones, POPULAR SCI. (Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.popsci.com/article/technology/futureurban-planning-zoning-drones [https://perma.cc/AEV3-YVRK] (citing an example from
urban designer, Mitchell Sipus, of what Chicago would look like if drones were regulated
like traffic, using color-coded flying zones).
180
See Ricker, supra note 127, at 63 (pointing out aeromodelling, the newest extreme sport).
Aeromodelling involves racing drones through airborne obstacle courses at speeds reaching
eighty miles per hour. Compare Ricker, supra note 127, at 63 (discussing various uses for
drones, including racing them through obstacle courses), with supra note 176 and
accompanying text (describing situations in which different drones flying across state
borders will need to change altitudes depending on the drone’s classification and the type of
property and structures the drone flies above).
181
Compare supra Part III.A (describing basic trespass), with infra Section III.C.2
(determining flaws in state laws regulating drones, ultimately leading to comparing state
statutes to aerial obstacle courses).
182
Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158 (outlining basic trespass), with RESTATEMENT
§ 159 (detailing requirements for invasions of air above land, which include entering the
immediate reaches of land and causing substantial interference with the land), and NEV. REV.
STAT. § 493.103(1)(a)–(b) (requiring an invasion within 250 feet above the property, the
property owner to notify the drone pilot not to enter the property owner’s airspace, and the
drone pilot to invade the property owner’s airspace again).
183
See supra Parts III.A, III.B (pointing out problems with both the Restatement and state
statutes addressing drone aerial trespass). However, blaming these sources is premature
because virtually no drone case law exists for either the Restatement or state legislatures to
build a definition for drone aerial trespass. See Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 180–81
(describing the fast pace of drone technology, which creates problems that traditional laws
cannot handle, and even some new “aerial trespass laws or other airspace rights
statutes . . . only offer limited” property rights). Furthermore, states remain somewhat
shackled by the FAA’s claim of “regulatory sovereignty over every cubic inch of outdoor air
in the United States.” See Huerta v. Haughwout, No. 3:16-cv-358 (JAM), 2016 WL 3919799,
at *4 (D. Conn. July 18, 2016); sources cited supra note 56.
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state options closed, property owners may need to pursue federal
avenues.184
C. Federal Avenues Shielding Property Owners From Aerial Trespass Claims
Knowing state roads lead to dead ends, property owners could
embark on a federal journey to sue an aerial trespassing drone. 185 But
federal roads are dead ends, too.186 While Congress claimed United States
air and gave the FAA regulatory authority, the agency’s authority is not
absolute.187 The FAA cannot regulate every inch of airspace or every
aircraft. 188 Furthermore, the FAA cannot write tort law.189
Federal avenues fail for three reasons.190 First, the FAA cannot
regulate every inch of air because reachable air belongs to the
landowner.191 Second, the FAA cannot regulate every aircraft because

See infra Part III.C.
See supra Parts III.A, III.B (analyzing why Restatement aerial trespass and state statutes
addressing drone aerial trespass fail to protect property owners from unwanted drone
invasions).
186
See infra Section III.C.1 (arguing the FAA cannot regulate all air); infra Section III.C.2
(examining why the FAA cannot regulate all drones); infra Section III.C.3 (explaining federal
courts do not want drone aerial trespass claims).
187
See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012) (stating the federal government “has exclusive
sovereignty of airspace of the United States,” and delegating authority to the FAA to develop
plans for use of navigable airspace, regulate airspace for safety, and ensure efficient use of
airspace); DOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 22 (“It is well settled that agencies do not
wield inherent powers, and that any authority they do have must be delegated by
Congress.”). See also sources cited supra note 56 (quoting multiple authorities that question
exactly how expansive Congress intended FAA regulatory authority to reach regarding
airspace control).
188
See infra Sections III.C.1, III.C.2 (explaining the FAA lacks authority over hobby drones
and “immediate reaches” air). See, e.g., FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a) (limiting the FAA from
regulating hobby drones); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (granting
property owners “exclusive control of the immediate reaches” airspace to fully enjoy their
land).
189
See sources cited supra note 187 (enumerating duties Congress gave the FAA and stating
an agency’s authority is limited to the regulatory powers Congress delegates under statute).
See also Sharkey, supra note 57, at 1706–07, 1710–25, 1734, 1738–40 (discussing Supreme Court
opinions on administrative agencies acting as legislative bodies, concerns with
administrative law replacing common law, and suggesting courts may need to work with
agencies to fix common law collisions with regulations).
190
See infra Sections III.C.1–C.3.
191
See infra Section III.C.1 (analyzing the distinction between property and federal
airspace). See, e.g., Causby, 328 U.S. at 264 (granting property owner’s “exclusive control of
the immediate reaches”).
184
185
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FMRA places limits on hobby drones.192 Finally, drone tort claims simply
do not belong in federal court.193
1.

Reachable Air

The FAA cannot regulate every inch of air because reachable air
belongs to the landowner.194 Above each piece of land sits a block of air
for the landowner to use.195 This block of air, or reachable air, attaches to
the land as part of the whole property and absorbs its protections. 196
The FAA claims power over all United States air and warns states that
writing aerial trespass laws interferes with the FAA’s federal airspace.197
However, trespass laws protect property.198 If property includes land and
reachable air, then aerial trespass laws protect reachable air.199 Reachable
See infra Section III.C.2.
See infra Section III.C.3. See, e.g., Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, 2017 WL
1088093 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2017) (finding a trespass to chattels complaint, when defendant
shot plaintiff’s drone from the sky, belonged in state court because the core of the issue was
state tort law).
194
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (“Yet it is obvious that if the
landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the
immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. . . . The landowner owns at least as much
of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land.”).
195
See id.
196
See id. at 264–67. The Causby Court coined this block of air the “immediate reaches,”
defining it as “superadjacent airspace at [a] low altitude” that a landowner “can occupy or
use in connection with the land.” Id. at 264–65. In other words, the usable low altitude air
that sits on top of the land belongs to the property owner. Id.
197
See Huerta v. Haughwout, No. 3:16-cv-358 (JAM), 2016 WL 3919799, at *4 (D. Conn. July
18, 2016) (“It appears from oral argument as well as from the FAA’s website that the FAA
believes it has regulatory sovereignty over every cubic inch of outdoor air in the United
States (or at least over any airborne objects therein).”). See also Final Rule, supra note 98, at
42,194 (determining “[s]ubstantial air safety issues are implicated when State or local
governments attempt to regulate [drones],” and to keep federal airspace safe, “[f]or example,
consultation with the FAA is recommended when State or local governments enact [drone]
restrictions on flight altitude, flight paths; operational bans; or any regulation of navigable
airspace”); id. at 42,119 (“With regard to property rights, trespassing on property (as opposed
to flying in the airspace above a piece of property) without the owner’s permission may be
addressed by State and local trespassing law.”).
198
See supra Part II.A (describing the right to exclude and how property owners exercise
this right with trespass claims). See also SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 49
(explaining that property owners use trespass laws to protect a property owner’s right to
exclude).
199
See Causby, 328 U.S. at 265 (“The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close
to the land that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We
think that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions
of it are in the same category as invasions of the surface.”). If trespass laws protect the right
to exclude, and property owners possess the immediate reaches, then trespass extends to the
immediate reaches, thereby allowing trespass for invasions of the immediate reaches. Id. See
also supra Part II.A (explaining the bundle of rights that comes with property); supra notes
192
193
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air does not float in federal airspace.200 Instead, reachable air sinks below
federal air and anchors to the ground as part of the landowner’s
property.201 Thus, the FAA cannot regulate every inch of air because
reachable air belongs to the landowner, not the federal government. 202
2.

Unreachable Aircraft

The FAA cannot regulate every aircraft because FMRA limits the
FAA’s authority over hobby drones. 203 Congress left a safety net for the
FAA to snare high-flying hobby drones, but the FAA claims the safety net
can reach down into low-altitude airspace and catch low-flying hobby
drones.204 However, courts have found statutory language clear enough
195–96 and accompanying text (defining property as including both the land and the block
of air on top of the land).
200
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). In fact, the Court found federal
government planes infringing on the property owner’s airspace amounted to a
Constitutional taking. Id. at 267.
201
See id. at 264; Haughwout, 2016 WL 3919799, at *5 (quoting Causby for giving property
owners’ some airspace but failing to rule on whether the FAA should control property owner
airspace when objects fly through it because the issue was not relevant in resolving the case).
Trespass protects a property owner’s right to exclude. SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note
24, at 49. Drones that trespass infringe on a property owner’s right to exclude by invading
the property’s air. Id. Thus, a drone commits aerial trespass by invading private property,
not federal airspace. Id. Absent more facts that make national airspace (air 500 feet above
ground) unsafe, aerial trespass does not ring any federal bells. See also Farber, supra note 135,
at 382–84 (reporting the FAA’s definition for navigable airspace covers air within 500 feet of
the ground). Compare 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012) (providing the federal government with
control over United States air, and tasking the FAA with regulatory duties), with Causby, 328
U.S. at 264–67 (allowing the property owner to keep reachable air under traditional property
use and exclusion purposes), and IND. CODE § 8–21–4–3 (stating “ownership of the space
above the lands and waters of this state is declared to be vested in the several owners of the
surface beneath”).
202
See Causby, 328 U.S. at 264 (extending property owner exclusion rights to the
“immediate reaches” airspace); SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 49 (stating trespass
protects the right to exclude). See also Farber, supra note 135, at 382–84 (explaining that most
drones fly within 500 of the ground).
203
See supra Section II.B.2; supra note 71 and accompanying text. See, e.g., FMRA, supra note
69, § 336(a) (preventing the FAA from applying rules and regulations to hobby drones).
204
According to Congress, drones that fit into the hobby drone definition and pass the
hobby drone test avoid FAA regulations. See FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a), (c) (enumerating
the hobby drone definition and test). However, Congress also gave the FAA a safety net to
snare hobby drones “who endanger the safety of the national airspace system.” Id. § 336(b).
While Congress likely left the safety net to attack drones flying in high altitude airspace, the
FAA interpreted the safety net’s scope to include low-altitude airspace too. See FAA
INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 14–15 (“For example, the FAA regulates low-altitude
operations to protect people and property on the ground.”); Final Rule, supra note 98, at
42,194 (suggesting states ask the FAA before enacting low-altitude airspace laws). The actual
text of the statute’s safety net reads, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the
authority of the Administrator to pursue enforcement action against persons operating
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to avoid deferring to the FAA’s broad interpretation.205 For example,
Taylor torpedoed the FAA’s argument that the safety net allowed hobby
model aircraft who endanger the safety of the national airspace system.” FMRA § 336(b).
However, Congress buried the safety net in section (b) between the hobby drone test in
section (a) and the hobby drone definition in section (c). Id. § 336(a), (c). Under a plain text
reading of section (b), Congress may have merely intended to authorize the FAA to chase
mischievous and dangerous hobby drone pilots into court. Id. § 336(b). Or maybe the FAA’s
broad interpretation is correct, and Congress meant to give the FAA authority to write
general laws for all drones and merely refrain from specifically targeting hobby drones. See
FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 7 (“The statute does not require FAA to exempt
model aircraft from [safety and security] rules because those rules are not specifically
regarding [hobby drones].”). The FAA used the Special Rule’s safety net as a platform for
applying the Final Rule to hobby drones. See Final Rule, supra note 98, at 42,194 (applying
the Final Rule to hobby drones for national airspace safety purposes). In the Final Rule, the
FAA also used “safety concerns” to justify telling states to consult the FAA before writing
any aerial trespass laws. See id. at 42,064 (using the safety net to prevent states from writing
aerial trespass laws without first consulting the FAA). The FAA is no stranger to uniquely
interpreting congressional laws that intend to limit the FAA’s regulatory authority. See
sources cited supra note 56. According to the FAA, the Special Rule allows the FAA to
continue writing general safety laws for all aircraft, including hobby drones. See FAA
INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 7 (“Thus, the rulemaking prohibition would not apply in
the case of general rules that the FAA may issue or modify that apply to all aircraft, such as
rules addressing the use of airspace [] for safety or security reasons.”). Thus, the Special Rule
would only prevent the FAA from writing laws that specifically target hobby drones. See id.
(claiming “the prohibition against future rulemaking is not a complete bar on rulemaking
that may have an effect on [hobby drones] . . . the rulemaking limitation applies only to
rulemaking actions specifically ‘regarding a [hobby drone]’”). The FAA reasoned that
keeping national airspace safe includes protecting property owners, thus FAA regulations
still touch hobby drones that threaten the safety of property owners. See id. at 14–15 (“As
demonstrated by the FAA’s statutory and regulatory authorities, our charge to protect the
safety of the NAS is . . . intended to protect . . . persons and property on the ground.”).
205
The actual text of FMRA states, “[T]he Administrator of the [FAA] may not promulgate
any rule or regulation regarding a [hobby drone], or an aircraft being developed as a [hobby
drone].” FMRA, supra note 69, § 336(a). Presumably, courts have found congressional intent
clear enough to avoid Chevron analysis. See Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089, 1092–94 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (finding FMRA prohibits the FAA from writing rules that apply to hobby drones,
the FAA’s Registration Rule applied to hobby drones, thus was unlawful, and that
“[s]tatutory interpretation does not get much simpler”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–46 (1984) (determining that administrative agencies
interpreting a statute must first defer to clear Congressional intent, but if Congress leaves “a
gap for the agency to fill,” then courts must accept an agency’s reasonable statutory
interpretation). Compare FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 7, 14–15 (interpreting FMRA
as allowing the FAA to write general safety laws that apply to hobby drones as well as any
safety laws, including potential aerial trespass laws, to keep property owners safe), with
Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, at 8, 2017 WL 1088093 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2017)
(“[A]lthough the FAA certainly has an interest in enforcing its regulations governing federal
airspace, its interest in applying those regulations in the context of a state law tort claim for
trespass to chattels is limited or nonexistent.”), and Huerta v. Haughwout, No. 3:16-cv-358
(JAM), 2016 WL 3919799, at *4 (D. Conn. July 18, 2016) (stating “[n]o clause in the
Constitution vests the federal government with a general police power over all of the air or
all objects that leave the ground,” and “it is far from clear that Congress intends—or could

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss1/8

Farris: Flying Inside America's Drone Dome and Landing in Aerial Trespass

2018]

Aerial Trespass Limbo

285

drone regulations, holding the hobby drone Registration Rule violated
FMRA.206
Furthermore, the FAA’s Special Rule interpretation wreaks havoc on
property owners inside America’s drone dome by creating a hybrid class
of drones that lands between hobby and civil drones. 207 First, the FAA’s
approach forces some hobby drones to comply with unnecessary
regulations.208 Second, the FAA’s approach opens backdoor channels to
constitutionally intend—to regulate all that is airborne on one’s own property and that poses
no plausible threat to or substantial effect on air transport or interstate commerce in
general”), and Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1093–94 (holding “[t]he FAA’s Registration Rule violates
Section 336 of the [FMRA]” because the Special Rule “prohibits the FAA from promulgating
‘any rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft[,]’” thus, a drone registration rule is
“unlawful to the extent that it applies to model aircraft”).
206
See Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1093 (invalidating the FAA’s argument that a rule requiring
hobby drones to register is not a rule and even if it is, the safety net allows the FAA to
demand hobby drone registration). According to the court, “[s]tatutory interpretation does
not get much simpler.” Id. at 1092 (citing FMRA § 336).
207
Drone clarification placed drones into three categories: government (public) drones,
commercial (civil) drones, and model aircraft (hobby drones). See Drone Clarification, supra
note 65, at 6689–90 (specifying which regulations apply to each drone class). According to
the FAA’s FMRA interpretation, some drones fall into a fourth category of “Not Hobby”
drones (or at least a broader category of drones). FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 11.
These hybrid drones are not used commercially but must comply with FAA rules,
registrations, and regulations. See id. at 10 (calling the use “incidental to a person’s business,”
and “[a]lthough they are not commercial operations conducted for compensation or hire,”
they still “do not qualify as a hobby or recreation flight because of the [business] nexus . . . ”).
The FAA asserts that hobby drones that fail either the hobby drone test or the hobby drone
definition “are nonetheless unmanned aircraft, and as such, are subject to all existing [and
future] FAA regulations . . . and the FAA intends to apply its regulations to such unmanned
aircraft.” Id. at 6–7. Thus, once a drone leaves visual line of sight, it qualifies as an “operation
not conducted strictly for hobby or recreation purposes,” and qualifies as a hybrid drone,
subject to FAA rules and regulations. Id. at 8–10.
208
Some hobby drones that have no need for commercial benefits, like those granted in
Part 107, will have to pay a fee, register will the FAA, and comply with FAA regulations. See
FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 6–11 (describing how some noncommercial uses are
not hobby uses and qualify as a “Not-Hobby” use subject to FAA regulations); supra Section
II.B.3 (discussing how Part 107 created a drone dome inside America, granting all-access
passes for qualifying drones to fly anywhere within 400 feet of the ground). For example,
flying a drone to check crops in a field for personal use qualifies as a hobby drone according
to the FAA. FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 11. However, a person flying a drone to
check crops in a field that belong to a farming operation is not a hobby use. Id. The FAA
does not specifically call the use commercial, but simply labels it “Not Hobby.” Id. Thus,
small farmers using drones to check fields are hybrid drones, according to the FAA, and need
to comply with FAA fees and regulations because the drone is “incidental[ly]” used to make
a profit on those crops. Id. at 10. These small farmers will have access to the commercial
drone dome and will need to pay fees, despite having no need for most commercial benefits
and reaping no direct commercial profit from the drone’s use. Compare Final Rule, supra note
98, at 42,064 (offering explanations for Part 107), and 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2017) (regulating drone
dome qualifiers), with FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 11 (illustrating some drones
may not be commercial but must register and comply with FAA regulations).
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the drone dome, handing out drone dome passes to hobby-like drones
with no substantial commercial use.209 More courts must check the FAA’s

209
Some hobby drone pilots may want the benefits of the commercial drone dome and
could qualify as a hybrid drone by claiming incidental business use, despite having no
commercial purpose. See 14 C.F.R. § 107.51(b) (2017) (allowing qualifying drones to fly
anywhere within 400 feet of the ground); FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 10–11
(suggesting drones used for incidental business purposes, even if not for profit, qualify for
FAA regulations). As a hybrid drone, the pilot will be subject to the FAA’s regulations—
both regulations that shackle the drone and free the drone for use as if it were a commercial
drone. FAA INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 6–7, 10–11 (asserting that hybrid drones
remain subject to FAA rules and “the FAA intends to apply its regulations to such [drones]”).
Thus, hobby drone pilots seeking hybrid drone classification could theoretically pay a fee
and register with the FAA solely to gain access to the drone dome. Id. Once cloaked with
the privileges given to drone dome access holders, these hybrid drones could fly anywhere
over the country within 400 feet of the ground—including right above backyards, near
apartment windows, and outside businesses. See, e.g., Rebecca J. Rosen, So This Is How it
Begins: Guy Refuses to Stop Drone-Spying on Seattle Woman, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/05/so-this-is-how-it-begins-guyrefuses-to-stop-drone-spying-on-seattle-woman/275769/ [https://perma.cc/SU28-MBLY]
(reporting a man refused to remove his drone from flying within feet of a couple’s home,
claiming the flight was legal and for “research” purposes); Milos, supra note 4, at 34
(providing an example of a hobbyist drone pilot claiming commercial use). In Seattle, a
woman spotted a drone flying feet from her home’s third-story window. Id. Her husband
approached the pilot, who refused to leave, claiming “it was legal for him to fly the drone
over their yard and adjacent to their windows” because he was conducting “research.” Id.
The couple called the police, who never showed up, and the strange man walked away
eventually. Id. In another case, a woman saw a drone hovering outside her twenty-sixthfloor apartment window as she put on clothes. Id. at 35. This time, the man apologized,
reassuring her he was using the drone commercially, taking “pictures of real estate and
architecture.” Id. These are merely a few examples of how a hybrid drone, or even
commercial drone, classification could operate as a backdoor to the drone dome. Compare
§ 107.51(b) (permitting some drones to fly anywhere within 400 feet of the ground), and FAA
INTERPRETATION, supra note 71, at 6–7, 10–11 (interpreting FMRA as creating a class of “Not
Hobby” drones, including those used by realtors to photograph property), with Milos, supra
note 4, at 34 (mentioning cases of drones hovering over property to spy on people), and
Farber, supra note 135, at 385 (reporting a Brooklyn newspaper found a drone spying through
a thirtieth-floor window, after which the pilot claimed to be an architect “surveilling the
property for potential development”).
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attempts to step beyond its regulatory bounds. 210 In the meantime, drones
will continue swarming federal court dockets.211
3.

Actions for Aerial Trespass Belong in State Court

Aerial trespass claims belong in state court because trespass creates a
tort action.212 Trespass torts defend the right to exclude.213 The aerial right
to exclude extends only through reachable air. 214 Thus, finding aerial
trespass does not require defining federal airspace.215
210
See, e.g., Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089, 1092–94 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding the FAA’s
argument that FMRA allowed it to require hobby drone registration for air safety purposes
invalid because Congress was clear that FMRA prohibited the FAA from regulating hobby
drones); Huerta v. Haughwout, No. 3:16-cv-358 (JAM), 2016 WL 3919799, at *4 (D. Conn. July
18, 2016) (concluding “[n]o clause in the Constitution vests the federal government with a
general police power over all of the air or all objects that leave the ground,” and Congress
has not expressed intent to regulate every airborne object that flies over private property,
especially those posing no real threat to the property); Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006TBR, at 8, 2017 WL 1088093 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2017) (stating “the FAA certainly has an
interest in enforcing its regulations governing federal airspace,” however, those interests are
“limited or nonexistent” in the context of “state law tort claim[s]”).
211
See, e.g., infra Section III.C.3 (analyzing why drone tort claims do not belong in federal
court); Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, 2017 WL 1088093 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 21,
2017) (illustrating one federal court’s dismissal of a drone tort claim).
212
See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 118 (connecting “[t]he tort of trespass” to protecting
“exclusive possession of real property”). Johnson explains, “tort law is a creature of the state,
rather than the national, government,” and “America’s federal system” gives “each state []
broad leeway to define” tort law and liability. Id. at 4.
213
See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 118 (“The tort of trespass to land [] protects a possessor’s
interest in exclusive possession of real property.”); SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at
49–50 (“In practical terms, a landowner’s right to exclude is implemented through the tort
doctrine of trespass.”). See also SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 24, at 49 (explaining how
title to land allows a property owner to prevent others from entering and the right to exclude
is one of the most “essential sticks” given to property owners).
214
See supra Section III.C.1 (analyzing how some air belongs to the property owner, not the
federal government). See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258–59, 264 (1946)
(finding a landowner’s property no longer extends to the heavens and air is a public
highway, but a landowner needs exclusive control of immediate reaches or at least
occupiable space).
215
One federal court dismissed a drone trespass lawsuit as a state tort claim that did not
belong in federal court. See Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, at 15, 2017 WL
1088093 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2017) (determining “the federal system as a whole” is not
concerned with whether the drone was flying in private property or in federal airspace). In
Boggs, despite Plaintiff Boggs arguing his drone was a federal aircraft flying in federal
airspace, the court found the trespass claim belonged in state court. See id. at 7 (calling a
claim for trespass to chattels, when a property owner shot a drone flying over the property,
a “garden-variety state tort claim”). The court determined the “face of the complaint” lacked
a federal question because the heart of the complaint alleged drone damages under state law.
Id. at 5–6. The court even speculated if Defendant Merideth could claim aerial trespass but
concluded that if the claim existed, it too belonged in state court. See id. at 14 (examining if
a federal question existed on the defendant’s side but ultimately determining that even if the
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Additionally, federal courts suggest the FAA does not have power to
regulate claims that primarily touch state tort and property laws. 216
Courts express concern that the FAA reaches too far with regulatory
powers by dipping into multiple branches of government.217 Thus, aerial
trespass claims belong in state court—not federal courts, not state
legislatures, and not federal agencies.218
IV. CONTRIBUTION: ARRIVE AND HOVER
State courts need to redefine aerial trespass to protect property
Instead of drafting
owners from unwanted drone invasions.219

defendant could bring a claim against the plaintiff, any claim for “invasion of privacy and
trespass” belonged in state court). See also Rule, Drone Zoning, supra note 5, at 151 (“States’
and municipalities’ long histories of regulating activities in the low-altitude airspace where
small civilian drones fly cast further doubt on the notion that the FAA’s field of broad
regulatory jurisdiction engulfs that space.”).
216
See, e.g., Boggs, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, at 8 (concluding that the FAA’s “interest in
applying those regulations [governing federal airspace] in the context of a state law tort claim
for trespass to chattels is limited or nonexistent”); Huerta v. Haughwout, No. 3:16-cv-358
(JAM), 2016 WL 3919799, at *4 (D. Conn. July 18, 2016) (finding the Constitution lacks a clause
vesting “all of the air or all objects that leave the ground” with the federal government, and
“it is far from clear that Congress intends—or could constitutionally intend—to regulate all
that is airborne on one’s own property and that poses no plausible threat to or substantial
effect on air transport or interstate commerce in general”).
217
See Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding the FAA
incorrectly interpreted the scope of the Special Rule’s safety net and violated FMRA’s Special
Rule). See also Sharkey, supra note 57, at 1710–22 (reporting the Supreme Court’s concern
with agencies trying to write laws). Even Supreme Court Justices agree that administrative
agencies should refrain from tangling legislative duties with executive branch functions to
avoid “raising a serious separation-of-powers issue.” Id. at 1714–22.
218
See infra Part IV (explaining why state courts need to resolve aerial trespass laws for
drones). Defining where property rights end and federal airspace begins may not be relevant
for aerial trespass because property owners only own the immediate reaches. See United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (leaving airspace within the immediate reaches for
property owners). If landowners only keep reachable air, states could define how much air
anchors to state property, allowing the FAA and state legislatures to coordinate in defining
the remaining airspace. See id. at 258–59, 264 (determining some air belongs to the
landowner, and the remainder is a public highway). Regardless of how much air anchors to
land and how much floats in federal airspace, aerial trespass claims still fall into state tort
territory because the invaded air attaches to state property, not federal airspace. See, e.g.,
supra Section III.C.1 (describing how some airspace stays with the property as airspace
anchored to the ground). However, the exact point that reachable air becomes federal
airspace, or some other layer of air, is beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., DOLAN &
THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 8 (exploring unanswered questions from Causby, like “the
dividing line between the ‘immediate reaches’ of the surface and public domain airspace,”
and if “navigable airspace [can] intersect with the ‘immediate reaches’”).
219
See supra Part III (eliminating all other federal and state options for resolving aerial
trespass laws and disputes).
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complicated legislation, state courts can simply tweak basic trespass. 220 By
building from basic trespass, aerial trespass will retain exclusion rights
without launching into interstellar reasoning. 221 Part IV.A introduces
arrive and hover as elements to supplement basic trespass.222 Part IV.B
explains how these new elements repair today’s broken aerial trespass
laws by supplying state courts with a simple solution that links drone
aerial trespass to land trespass.223
A. Arrive and Hover
Arrive-and-hover laws swap basic trespass language with new
elements.224 For example, basic trespass requires: (1) intent to (2) enter
(3) without consent.225 By replacing “intent to enter” with “arrive and
hover,” aerial trespass will retain basic trespass principles and hand
property owners a drone-swatting law.226 Thus, aerial trespass requires a
drone: (1) arrive and (2) hover (3) without consent.227 First, arrival scoops
up intent and the initial entry.228 Second, hover covers movement after
arrival.229 Finally, consent welds the same basic trespass privileges to
aerial trespass.230
First, arrival applies basic trespass principles like intent and the initial
entrance to drones.231 Arrival means intent to enter the air above the

See supra Parts III.A, III.B (discussing the problems with the Restatement’s outdated test
that requires aerial trespass by an aircraft to rise to the level of a Constitutional taking and
state statutes that create completely new aerial trespass laws that retain none of the principles
underlying basic trespass and its exclusionary purpose).
221
See supra Part II.A (defining a property owner’s right to exclude as a crucial purpose for
trespass laws). See also supra note 160 and accompanying text (explaining how recent
attempts to define aerial trespass tend to lean more toward vague nuisance and outdated
takings tests).
222
See infra Part IV.A.
223
See infra Part IV.B.
224
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 225–27 (breaking down each element of
basic trespass and separating aerial trespass into elements similar to basic trespass).
225
See supra Section II.C.1.
226
See supra Part II.A (explaining the principles of basic trespass). Compare supra note 225
and accompanying text (stating the elements of basic trespass), with infra note 227 (offering
the new elements of aerial trespass).
227
This is the author’s personal contribution. Cf. supra Section II.C.1 (defining trespass and
focusing on entrance, which includes entering or remaining).
228
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 231–36.
229
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 237–43.
230
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 244–49.
231
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 225–27 (supplying an aerial trespass
definition that replaces basic trespass with similar elements).
220
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land.232 The moment a drone flies over the land, it arrives.233 However,
arrival alone cannot create aerial trespass because every flying aircraft
would constantly be trespassing.234 Arrival expands entrance too far by
calling aerial entrances by helicopters, planes, or civil or public drones a
trespass.235 Aerial trespass needs to target the drone pilot, while giving
other aircraft flexibility.236 Thus, once a drone arrives over land, the
trespass clock starts ticking.
Second, hover follows the drone’s movement after arriving. 237 Hover
means a slow, low, or stopped flight path.238 Hover tracks the drone.239
Slow hovers include slowdowns and slow flights. 240 Stopped hovers
include flights that stay suspended over land.241 Low hover offers
flexibility by including other flights through reachable air. 242 Hover

232
Cf. supra Section III.C.1 (pinpointing the intent element under basic trespass, requiring
only intent to enter land).
233
Cf. supra Section III.C.1 (concluding intent only requires intent to enter or be present,
not intent to trespass).
234
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (finding if a property owner held
title to all the air above the land, “every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to
countless trespass suits”).
235
See id. (acknowledging that “such private claims to the airspace would clog [aerial]
highways [and] seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
interest”).
236
Compare id. at 261–67 (giving some air to the property owner but leaving the rest for the
public to use), with supra Part I (illustrating a drone pilot’s use of a hobby drone to fly and
spy on private property).
237
This is the author’s personal contribution. Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158(a)–(c)
(describing trespass as causing something to enter, remaining, or failing to remove).
238
Cf. Hover, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hover
[https://perma.cc/BE8Y-ECTA] [hereinafter Hover, MERRIAM-WEBSTER] (defining hover as
“to remain suspended over a place or object,” like a helicopter); Hover, CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/hover
[https://perma.cc/8Z7G-J2SL] [hereinafter Hover, CAMBRIDGE) (explaining that hover
means “to stay in the air in one place: A helicopter hovered overhead”); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 7, § 158(b) (qualifying remaining on land as sufficient to satisfy trespass).
239
This is the author’s personal contribution. Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158(c)
(stating that failing to remove something from the land of another creates a trespass).
240
Slow hovers combine remaining on land with aerial invasions. Compare RESTATEMENT,
supra note 7, § 158(b) (noting that remaining on land creates a trespass), with RESTATEMENT
§ 158 cmt. g (including air invasions as a § 159 trespass).
241
See Hover, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 238 (describing hover as “remain[ing]
suspended over a place or object”); Hover, CAMBRIDGE, supra note 238 (explaining hover as
“stay[ing] in the air in one place”). Stopped hovers combine remain, failure to remove, and
aerial trespass. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158(b)–(c) cmt. g.
242
See infra Part IV.B (elaborating on how “low hover” can evolve into layers). Basically,
low hover covers all other flights by drones through Causby’s reachable air. See United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss1/8

Farris: Flying Inside America's Drone Dome and Landing in Aerial Trespass

2018]

Aerial Trespass Limbo

291

catches the drone pilot while providing faster, high-altitude aircraft
necessary operational freedom.243
Finally, consent stays the same.244 Hovering without consent
completes the tort.245 Current laws give drones automatic privileges to
trespass.246 Reviving consent returns the drone-swatting exclusion stick
to the property owner.247 Consent includes ordering a drone-delivered
package or giving a drone pilot permission. 248 Without consent, the drone
pilot completes aerial trespass.249
B. Commentary
The purpose of aerial trespass is to keep unwanted drones from flying
too low and hanging above land. 250 Arrive-and-hover laws keep aerial
trespass simple.251 Under basic trespass, entrance is key.252 Under arrive

243
See supra Part I (illustrating an example of a drone hovering over girls sunbathing in a
backyard).
244
See supra Section II.C.1 (defining basic trespass as entering another’s property without
consent).
245
Intentional wrongs lack consent. See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 137 (“In the context of
intentional torts, it is said that ‘[a]ll intended wrongs . . . have in common the element that
they are inflicted without the consent of the victim.” (quoting Fricke v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglass Corp., 571 So. 2d 130, 132 (La. 1990))). With trespass, entrance inflicts the wrong.
See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 118 (“A person who intentionally and without consent or
privilege enters on, under, or above the land of another commits a trespass.”); id. at 119
(reporting “[a]ll that is required is the intent to be present,” not intent to trespass). With
aerial trespass, hover inflicts the wrong. See discussion supra notes 231–43 and
accompanying text (discussing how arrival gets the ball rolling, but hover completes the
tort).
246
See supra Part III.B (noting state statutes allow one free invasion). See also supra Section
II.B.3 (explaining Part 107 and how the drone dome grants a privilege to some drones); supra
Section III.C.2 (describing how Part 107’s drone dome infringes on the exclusion rights of
private property owners).
247
Compare supra Part II.A (explaining the right to exclude), and supra Section III.C.1
(analyzing how far the right to exclude extends), with supra Part III.B (pointing out the failure
of aerial trespass statutes to account for consent).
248
See supra Part II.A (detailing consent and privileges as applied to tort law and trespass).
249
Compare supra Part I (applying the drone pilot situation in the hook to the lack of consent
principle in trespass), with supra note 245 and accompanying text (noting how intentional
torts presume lack of consent and are complete once the wrong is committed).
250
See supra Part II.A (discussing the right to exclude as the core of trespass).
251
Compare supra note 225 and accompanying text (outlining basic trespass), and supra note
227 and accompanying text (listing aerial trespass elements as basic trespass derivatives),
with supra Section II.C.1 (noting the Restatement’s approach to aerial trespass, which blends
Causby’s takings analysis with nuisance principles), and supra Section II.C.2 (describing state
statutes addressing aerial trespass, which allow a free pass for drones to invade private
property until the property owner pursues and evicts the drone).
252
See supra Section II.C.1 (explaining how basic trespass elements rely on entrance).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press,

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 [], Art. 8

292

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

and hover, entrance is still key because the moment a drone arrives over
the property, the clock starts ticking. 253 Once it hovers, it trespasses.254
Opponents may argue that aerial property rights need defined.255 Not
yet.256 States should not start slicing statutes into the sky until states gain
a better understanding of how each state will use drones.257 Furthermore,
“low hover” can evolve and separate into layers based on drone classes.258
For example, a hobby drone trespasses by hovering low enough to see, but
a commercial drone may require more than mere sight to commit a lowhovering trespass.259 Instead, commercial drones may trespass based on
other low-hover factors like height, time of day, and frequency.260 Thus,
if a commercial drone hovers within 100 feet, at night, or ten times in one
day, it trespasses.261 But any hobby drone that hovers trespasses. 262

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
255
See supra Part III.B (analyzing some state statutes attempting to draw lines in the sky for
property owners).
256
The last solution a confused airspace system needs is more statutes. See supra Part II.B
(expanding on Congress and the FAA trying to untangle the airspace and aircraft ownership
conundrum); sources cited supra note 216 (citing federal cases acknowledging that states are
likely better suited for low-altitude airspace claims).
257
Aerial trespass is not a federal government issue. See supra Section III.C.1
(differentiating between a property owner’s immediate reaches airspace and federal air);
supra Part III.B (detailing the problems with current statutes).
258
This is the author’s personal contribution. See, e.g., supra notes 259–62 and
accompanying text (explaining how low hover can adapt to fit the purposes and uses of
varying classes of drones).
259
Cf. Final Rule, supra note 98, at 42,119 (mentioning one “commenter proposed a 100foot limit for incidental incursions and a 300-foot limit for intentional flights across private
property without permission”). The idea is that hobby drones arrive and hover easier than
commercial drones.
260
See Final Rule, supra note 98, at 42,119 (proposing multiple layers of airspace). See also
14 C.F.R. § 107.29(a) (2016) (“No person may operate a small unmanned aircraft system
during night.”).
261
See sources cited supra note 260 (citing federal regulations restricting night flights and
considering multiple flight floors). Restricting multiple flights, night flights, and placing a
100-foot altitude restriction on commercial drones are just a few examples of how to make
the “hover” element of aerial trespass more difficult to prove against commercial drones,
opposed to hobby drones, provided the drone operator can prove the drone was being used
for commercial purposes. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT § 159 cmt. l (stipulating that property rights
begin somewhere between fifty and 500 feet, landing around 150 feet); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264–67 (1946) (finding eighty-foot government invasions interfered
with the landowner’s right to use and exclude from the land’s immediate reaches).
262
Today’s hobby drones do not need the same legal cushions that commercial drones may
require, particularly because most drone tort claims stem from hobby drone abuse. See supra
Part II.A (defining the importance of the right to exclude); supra note 209 and accompanying
text (citing instances of hobby drones allegedly used for tortious conduct).
253
254

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss1/8

Farris: Flying Inside America's Drone Dome and Landing in Aerial Trespass

2018]

Aerial Trespass Limbo

293

Opponents may also argue that video capabilities and other
technology will allow drones to evade aerial trespass.263 However,
privacy laws can handle outer-layer drone claims that aerial trespass
cannot.264 Drones can still trespass over land without rising to the level of
a privacy invasion.265 Arrive and hover slaps unwanted drones hanging
over land with an intentional tort.266
Trespass protects the right to exclude.267 Aerial trespass is still a
trespass, trespass is still common law, and common law is still defined by
courts.268 Arrive and hover avoids navigating through complicated
privacy laws and privileges created by state statutes, allows states to
collect information on drone use, and adapts as drone use evolves. Arrive
and hover keeps aerial trespass simple. 269 Arrive and hover slowly targets
a drone, then slaps it with a quick tort claim.
V. CONCLUSION
State courts must define aerial trespass to protect property owners
from drone invasions. Drones cannot take exclusion rights from property
owners. First, the Restatement uses a takings test. A trespass is not a
taking. Second, state statutes give drones a free pass to invade until the
property owner hunts down the drone pilot and fires off a warning shot.
But trespass through the air is still trespass. And trespass is still an
intentional tort. Third, the FAA places hurdles in front of state
legislatures, but the FAA does not control all the air or all the drones.
Finally, drone tort claims belong in state court, not federal court.
Therefore, state courts must carve a new definition for aerial trespass.
263
See supra Section II.C.2 (explaining states have reacted to drones invading privacy with
drone privacy statutes).
264
See supra Section II.C.2 (providing sources that explain how drones impact privacy laws
and trespass separately).
265
Again, privacy is beyond the scope of this Note. See sources cited supra note 128 (listing
sources for further investigation into privacy laws as applied to drones). But for the sake of
argument, trespass protects the right to exclude. See supra Part II.A (discussing the genesis
of trespass as a means to protect the right to exclude). And a privacy intrusion upon
seclusion claim places a heavier burden on the property owner. See JOHNSON, supra note 39,
at 1026 (requiring an intentional interference into a secluded space that “would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person”).
266
See supra Part IV.A (describing how arrive-and-hover elements interact to catch drones
that trespass).
267
See supra Part II.A (elaborating on the bundle of rights and the right to exclude).
268
See supra Parts III.A–III.B.
269
Arrive and hover aims to keep aerial trespass simple by placing drones into a category
somewhere between Restatement § 158’s balloons and kites and Restatement § 159’s airplanes
or aircraft. Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 158 (noting balloons and kites as objects
capable of trespassing), with RESTATEMENT § 159 (describing trespass when committed by an
aircraft).
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Arrive and hover chisels the building blocks of basic trespass into a
contemporary claim that fits on the mantelpiece of modern courtrooms.
Speaking of mantelpieces, the drone pilot’s drone would probably
look good on yours. You better get back to your kitchen window and
check on your daughters.
Looks like you dropped your coffee mug. It shattered on the new
kitchen tile, and now the dog is licking it up. Great.
Looks like the drone is still hovering over your backyard. With one
hand on a broom and one on a shotgun, take a moment to arrive and hover
on your legal options. Right now, the drone pilot is violating your right
to exclude. But he is not trespassing. The Restatement’s test fails you
because the drone pilot has not constitutionally taken your property. And
any state statute fails you because the drone pilot’s first invasion is free.
His second invasion will be free too if you let that drone escape. Until you
chase down the drone, shake your fist at the pilot, and catch him in the act
again, every invasion is free.
Your left hand wraps around a wooden broom handle. Your right
hand clenches a shotgun barrel. That drone still hovers over your
harmless little girls. Time to act.
Take the broom. Shoo the drone away. Maybe now the drone pilot
will stop invading your property. Maybe no drone will ever fly over your
property again.
Suddenly, the living room television breaks your concentration. “The
future will likely include a lot more drones buzzing overhead.” 270 The
morning news report echoes through the hallway, bounces into the
kitchen, and climbs into your ear. In the next three years, hobby drone
sales will double, and total drone sales will triple, according to the FAA. 271

270
Johnathan Vanian, Drone Sales Are About To Go Crazy, FORTUNE (Mar. 25, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/03/25/federal-governmen-drone-sales-soar/
[https://perma.cc/G4GK-BVRW].
271
See id. (reporting drone sales will nearly triple by 2020, and hobby drone sales will
“more than double,” according to the FAA).
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No.
More drones?
More drone pilots invading your property?
Drones are coming—whether you like it or not.272
Kyle Joseph Farris*

This Note is for educational and entertainment purposes only and in no way intends to
offer legal advice for resolving property disputes nor is it meant to encourage property
owners to use violence.
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